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1Chapter 1: Literature Review
Introduction
Discretion happens at every stage of the criminal justice process: from the 
police discretion to arrest, to the prosecutors’ multiple discretionary decisions 
throughout a case, to the judges’ sentencing discretion.  Research on discretionary 
decisions is widespread, especially when looking at police and judges, but there is 
much less research evaluating prosecutorial discretion.  Although each professional in 
the criminal justice system uses discretion, it has become apparent that the prosecutor 
is one of the most influential and powerful persons in the criminal justice system.  
This is largely because of their involvement in decisions at multiple stages of case 
processing and the lack of public or judicial review of their decision making 
processes (Misner, 1996; Kingsnorth et al. 2002; Griffin, 2001; Free, Jr., 2002).  
Research has shown that the use of prosecutorial discretion is a concern, specifically 
whether or not abuse of discretion is taking place, and whether or not decisions are 
being made differentially for different types of individuals.  
Thus far, much of the research on prosecutorial discretion is very explanatory 
and gives an overview of the cautions that need to be taken against abuse of 
discretion and the need for review of prosecutorial decisions.  Very little existing 
research empirically tests whether this abuse is taking place, and to what extent.  
Some research on prosecutorial discretion that does attempt to evaluate the status of 
prosecutorial discretion has been obtained through interviews and observations, and 
therefore, is highly qualitative (Neubauer, 1974). While this research has provided 
some insight into the decisions being made, there is a lack of quantitative assessment 
2of these decision-making processes as well as the implications of prosecutors’ choices 
for the public and individual defendants.  In addition, the majority of the research on 
prosecutorial discretion is in the realm of sentencing recommendations and factors 
that affect guideline departures, which in some cases, is the stage where there is the 
least likelihood of abuse of prosecutorial discretion because there is some extent of 
judicial review.  The discretionary decisions of a prosecutor begin much earlier in the 
timeline of a case, and before the effects on sentencing can be adequately assessed, 
the decisions preceding sentencing must also be evaluated.  The concentration of 
research on outcome decisions (sentencing) neglects to look at differential treatment 
during actual processing in the system (Albonetti, 1990).  This is important because 
some research has shown that abuse of discretion is more likely to occur and is less 
visible during earlier stages of case processing (especially with race) (Free, Jr., 2002; 
Farnworth and Teske, Jr., 1995).   
“Future research should address the importance of decision making at 
different stages of the criminal justice process to expose areas of potential 
unwarranted disparity or unfairness so that policy makers can act accordingly.” 
(Wilmot and Spohn, 2004, p. 340).  This call for more research is the basis of the 
current research focusing on prosecutorial discretion within the charging process.  
This topic has been neglected thus far in the discretion research while its importance 
has been sufficiently noted, specifically since the implementation of guidelines and 
the relevant conduct nature of the federal system.
The current study is an attempt to enhance the quantitative body of research in this 
area.  More specifically, this research will evaluate what factors influence a 
3prosecutor’s decision to use charge reductions in a case.  Do they follow the 
guidelines imposed on them by the United States Attorney’s Manual, or do they allow 
themselves to use extralegal factors to differentially use charge reductions for certain 
individuals?  Additionally, are these extralegal factors used differently across 
different sub-samples of individuals? 
Theoretical Perspective
The theory guiding this research is adapted from most sentencing research 
since the repercussions of charging decisions ultimately affect sentencing outcomes.  
This research turns to a merging of the focal concerns perspective of sentencing and 
attribution theory.   Attribution theory was linked to uncertainty avoidance by judges 
and applied to sentencing decisions in the work of Albonetti, but was later expanded 
into a focal concerns perspective.  This theoretical progression has had much support 
in empirical research, but still is only applied to judicial decision making in 
sentencing.  However, it seems logical and beneficial to the theories and future 
research to expand its application to earlier stages of processing.
An attribution is an “inference about why an even occurred or about a 
person’s dispositions.” (Greenberg & Ruback, 1991, p. 13).  This term was 
incorporated into criminal justice research in 1991 when Albonetti strived to develop 
a theoretical framework for understanding the inconsistent findings on the influence 
of certain variables on sentencing severity.  The result was an integration of 
uncertainty avoidance in decision making with causal attributions in punishment used 
to understand discretionary decision making by judges.  Within this framework, 
Albonetti (1991) acknowledges that in the absence of complete information, judges 
4seek to reduce uncertainty about a defendant by relying on rationality.  Sometimes the 
result of this rationality is decision making based on past experiences, stereotypes, 
and prejudices.  Attribution theory further explains this decision making process 
through findings that membership in certain social categories influences case 
outcomes and that the more stable the attributions, the more likely courtroom decision 
makers are to perceive an increase in the future risk of offending (Albonetti, 1991).  
More specifically, Albonetti (1991) comments that judges rely on specific attributes 
and “link race, gender, and outcomes from earlier processing stages to the likelihood 
of future criminal activity.” (p.250).   Albonetti’s actual test of this framework finds 
evidence that blacks receive harsher sentences than whites, females fair better in the 
system, and that those with prior felony convictions are more severely punished, 
which are all consistent with the hypothesized stereotypes for recidivating.
Some theorists saw Albonetti’s attribution process on the perceived 
blameworthiness of the defendant as only one piece of the process and expanded her 
theoretical framework into a focal concerns perspective (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; 
Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).  This perspective centers on three principles that 
courtroom actors focus on for decision making: the offenders’ blameworthiness 
(which is in essence Albonetti’s framework) and degree of harm caused to the victim, 
the protection of the community, and practical implications of sentencing decisions 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  Steffensmeier and Demuth (2001) show how causal 
attributions can be used in each of these focal concerns.  Judge’s views of 
blameworthiness are influenced mainly by offense severity, prior record, and the 
offender’s role in the crime.  Protection of the community draws on attributions that 
5affect the need to incapacitate the offender and/or the likelihood of recidivating, such 
as criminal history, the nature of the offense, and sometimes offender characteristics 
such as education, employment, and community ties, which may act as control over 
the offender.  Practical implications often “include concerns about the offender’s 
ability to do time, the costs to be borne by the correctional system, and the disruption 
of ties to children or other family members” (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001, p. 
151).  Offender characteristics regarding the physical stature of an individual and 
having children may be considered in this causal attribution process.
The basis of these theories suggests that while decisions made are supposed to 
take these principles into account, courtroom officials (mainly judges) sometimes 
lack adequate knowledge of a case due to time and information constraints to make 
these decisions and sometimes turn to stereotypes in decision making processes.  
Unfortunately, as shown in the literature, these stereotypes often include attributes 
that are not legally relevant (i.e. race, age, and gender) which may influence decisions 
alone or through interactions with each other, despite their use being forbidden by 
guidelines and policies (Albonetti, 1997; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier 
and Demuth, 2001).  Therefore, officials may be relying on their perceptions of who 
is dangerous to the community or what a violent offender looks like or who they think 
can physically survive in prison in order to make their sentencing decisions.
Although this theory is usually linked to judicial discretion, more recent 
research implies that it may be applicable to other courtroom actors by referring to its 
impact on “judges and other community actors” (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004, p.142) or 
“judges (and other court actors)” (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001, p.149).  
6However, none of the empirical research actually investigates this possibility any 
further than its mention.  I  argue that this theoretical perspective can also be 
expanded to prosecutors in charging decisions and plea negotiations.  With the 
quickness that a prosecutor is required to make charging decisions it seems plausible 
that one may rely on stereotypes and perceptions to decide on charges before 
adequately assessing the strength of a case.  This can further affect charge reduction 
decisions once the case is more closely evaluated and manifest itself in one of two 
ways.  First, prosecutors may overcharge defendants based on stereotypical 
perceptions and ultimately give large reductions to those defendants once the case is 
better assessed.  Alternatively, prosecutors may make charging decisions and then use 
stereotypes to provide sympathetic defendants with large reductions.  These 
sympathetic defendants would be those who go against stereotypes of a typical 
defendant and lead to the prosecutor wanting to give a less severe penalty (i.e. older, 
white, females who are educated and have children).  
Additionally, prosecutors may have their own focal concerns which influence 
their decisions during case processing.  Just as judges are likely to consider the 
public’s perception/evaluation of their judicial careers (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 
2001), prosecutors may also worry about the appearance of their careers as successful 
or unsuccessful, based on conviction rates.  Also, political forces may influence the 
focal concerns of prosecutors due to the necessity of being appointed to their position.  
Finally, a focal concern of prosecutors may be their opinion of the sentencing 
guidelines.  Research by Kramer and Ulmer (2002) suggest that downward departures 
are most likely when there has been a “mismatch between guideline sentence 
7recommendations and local courts’ ‘going rates’ and local actors’ definitions of 
offender blameworthiness and dangerousness.” (p. 922).  Their research showed that 
judges and prosecutors are most likely to disagree with the punitiveness of the 
guidelines when dealing with higher severity offenses or those with extensive prior 
records (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002).  Therefore, prosecutors may rely on some 
attributions (such as community ties) to justify departures in order to escape the harsh 
penalties dictated by the guidelines.  
In recognition of the interaction between judges and prosecutors in 
conjunction with the focal concerns perspective, prosecutors may realize how the 
information they allow judges to receive may affect judicial decisions through this 
attribution process.  In turn, prosecutors are able to capitalize on the loopholes that 
exist within the system to further prevent extreme punishments where they do not see 
fit. Tonry (1996) states that at least 24-35% of cases involve the circumvention of 
guidelines through a loophole used by the prosecutor either by changing the charge to 
one that has a maximum sentence below the minimum sentence of the original 
charge, making false statements on reports to the judge (i.e. not telling the judge that 
a gun was involved), or inducing substantial assistance departures when the defendant 
was not in fact an informant.  These loopholes prevent judges from receiving 
adequate information about a case, which can influence the causal attributions 
ascribed by judges in later processing.  Therefore, the current research seeks to show 
how prosecutors this causal attribution process in the interest of focal concerns results 
in the use of extralegal factors to offer charge reductions differentially across 
different age, gender, racial and ethnic groups. 
8Existing Research
Because there is very little current research specifically evaluating 
prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage across different groups, it is necessary to 
look at three bodies of literature to adequately understand the framework for the 
current research.  First, general prosecutorial discretion research is reviewed in order 
to show the concern for abuse of discretion and the lack of overview to prevent it 
from occurring.  Next, the charging literature highlights just how much power exists 
in this early stage of case processing.  And finally, sentencing literature shows the 
ultimate impact abuse of discretion can have in a case and illuminates the importance 
of focusing on earlier discretionary decisions, especially in the era of sentencing 
guidelines.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutors exercise discretion over charging in many ways.  They decide when a 
criminal charge will be filed, the level at which an alleged offender will be charged, 
whether or not a plea bargain will be proffered and when/if there is a reason to 
discontinue charges (Free, Jr., 2002; Albonetti, 1987).  Researchers seek to assess 
whether or not prosecutors are using legitimate (legal) or illegitimate (extralegal) 
factors as reasons for charging certain offenses.  In order to evaluate this concern, we 
must first look at what guidelines are put on prosecutors when it comes to making 
these decisions.  Because most charge reductions occur during plea bargains the 
guidelines for initiating and accepting a plea can be referenced for this information.  
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the court to accept a defendant’s 
plea to a certain charge in exchange for the dismissal of others if “the remaining 
9charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and 
accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or 
the sentencing guidelines.” (Campbell and Bemporad, 2003, p.12).  However, in their 
Introduction to Federal Guideline Sentencing Campbell and Bemporad (2003) caution 
that a charge bargain must be carefully analyzed to determine whether its “supposed 
benefit is real or illusory” (Campbell and Bemporad, 2003, p.12). It is because of this 
caution that it is necessary to assess which factors prosecutors are permitted to use in 
these charging decisions. 
For this information we turn to the United States Attorney’s Manual (USAM) by 
the Department of Justice (2000).  This manual outlines the principles of federal 
prosecution including considerations to be weighed in initiating plea agreements and 
impermissible considerations.  Relevant considerations can include: 
“defendant’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of 
others; defendant’s history with respect to criminal activity; nature and 
seriousness of the offense or offenses charged; defendant’s remorse or contrition 
and his/her willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct; the desirability of 
prompt and certain disposition of the case; the likelihood of obtaining a 
conviction at trial; the probable effect on witnesses; the probable sentence or other 
consequences if the defendant is convicted; the public interest in having the case 
tried rather than disposed of by a guilty plea; the expense of trial and appeal; the 
need to avoid delay in the disposition of other pending cases; and the effect upon 
the victim’s rights to restitution” (DOJ, 2000, §9-27.420). 
The USAM strictly lists which factors are not to weigh in the prosecutors decision to 
initiate or decline certain charges.  These factors include the defendant’s “race, 
religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities or beliefs; the 
attorney’s own personal feelings concerning the person, the person’s associates, or 
the victim; or the possible affect of the decision on the attorney’s own professional 
circumstances” (DOJ, 2000, §9-27.260).   In addition, it is stated in the USAM that 
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once the decision to prosecute is made, the government attorney should charge the 
most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant’s acts and that 
the attorney believes is likely to result in a conviction, and in turn, will yield the 
highest range under the sentencing guidelines (DOJ, 2000).  Attorney General John 
Ashcroft (2003) expands on this idea by stating that the charges filed should be 
believed by the prosecutor to be provable at trial.  Therefore, charges should not be 
filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea. Guidelines are set forth for federal 
prosecutors in an attempt to secure consistency within the Department of Justice 
because the outcome of a defendant’s case should not be contingent upon which 
prosecutor is assigned to handle the case (Ashcroft, 2003).  
The American Bar Association (ABA) standards for prosecutorial charging 
guidelines do not mirror the sentiments of the USAM.  While the ABA ethical 
standards discourage overcharging, they do not prohibit it (Griffin, 2001).  This 
conflict of standards is one reason why the public so heavily scrutinizes prosecutorial 
discretion. Another is that there is very little review of prosecutorial discretion 
(Albonetti, 1990).  Therefore, people feel that there is a high likelihood that abuse of 
discretion is happening, but there is no way of catching it. In addition, when there is a 
way of catching it in theory, it is often avoided. The public concern is nicely 
illustrated by Misner (1996) who stresses that most of the discretionary decisions 
made by prosecutors are virtually “unreviewable” and have led to a “hands off” 
police by the courts (p.725).   Most disturbing, Misner highlights numerous 
oppositions to the broadness of prosecutorial discretion and some of the suggestions 
for improvement, but repeatedly shows that these pleas and policy reforms have 
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fallen on deaf ears.  “The American criminal justice system does not respond well to 
suggestions for fundamental change.  Even calls for a more active control of 
prosecutorial discretion through rule-making have made little headway.” (Misner, 
1996, p.732).  
Lupton (2000) illustrates an attempt for control, but does not neglect the fact that 
they often fail by explaining vindictive prosecution claims that arise when the 
prosecutor’s use of the charging process violates due process.  A presumption of 
vindictiveness usually arises when a defendant is reindicted after being convicted and 
chooses to file an appeal and the prosecutor then decides to increase the number or 
severity of the charges.  A claim of presumption of vindictiveness can be overcome 
by objective evidence that the prosecution was proper. However, she then highlights 
one vindictive prosecution claim that was lost after a defendant was charged with a 
felony after requesting a jury trial when his original charges were misdemeanors 
because the prosecutor “stated that his decision to seek a felony indictment was not 
motivated by the request for a jury trial.” (Lupton, 2000, p.1294).  If this simply 
means that all a prosecutor has to do is say his prosecution is proper and does not 
have to show actual proof, then it seems plausible that abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion may be widespread.  This example certainly lends credence to professional 
and public concern.
It is necessary to highlight these guidelines in order to assess which situations 
go against the idea of charge reductions, regardless of whether or not they occur in 
conjunction with a plea bargain.  After all, if a prosecutor is required to file the most 
serious charge they believe can be proven at trial, and not reflect overcharging in 
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order to then impose a charge reduction to secure a guilty plea, then in reality, there is 
no legitimate reason a filing offense should not equal a terminating offense, unless it 
is one of the legally provided reasons.  Even if a prosecutor initiates a plea in order to 
avoid the costs of trial, the plea agreement should not include a charge reduction 
because that prevents the plea from reflecting the gravity of the circumstances the 
prosecutor believes to have been committed by the alleged offender, and the 
seriousness of what he/she can prove in court.  One instance where a charge reduction 
could still apply would be one that only reduces the number of charges, but the 
ultimate punishment would not be modified due to the widespread use of consecutive 
sentences.
It is important to note that Attorney General Ashcroft (2003) does 
acknowledge that departures from the list of what can be considered in charging 
decisions do exist, however, the circumstances are rare and so should the likelihood 
of their use.  More importantly, there is no mention that departures from the list of 
what is not to be considered are acceptable.  This is crucial because it is these factors 
that most researchers and the public are interested in examining, believing that they 
do indeed factor into prosecutors’ calculations of what charges to file and ultimately 
pursue.  
B. Charge Reductions/Bargaining
The research that has been conducted on charge reductions is limited in many 
ways.  First of all, the majority of this research is outdated because they were 
completed prior to the implementation of sentencing guidelines and some of the 
policies previously described.  In addition, most of this type of research is very 
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specialized and only looks at reductions that occur within cases for a specific criminal 
charge, most often burglary and robbery cases.  More notably, it is the conclusions 
from this research that are even more interesting.  Although most of the available 
research on charge reductions is in agreement on many of their findings, there are 
some conclusions that do not concur with others, and more interestingly, a number of 
the conclusions go against the authors’ hypotheses and what the public may expect.
Few quantitative studies have been conducted specifically on charge reductions 
over the past three decades (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987; Albonetti, 
1992; Farnworth and Teske, Jr., 1995).  While two of these only look at charge 
reductions that occur during plea bargains (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 
1987), one looks at charge reductions during the initial case screening (Albonetti, 
1992).  In addition, none of these studies looked at cases outside of assault, burglary, 
robbery, larceny, and theft.  Lastly, each of these studies looked at cases from specific 
districts, none of which were duplicates. Considering the majority of their findings 
were conflicting, this leads to suspicion that perhaps their findings are influenced by 
certain district characteristics that vary between the studies, and therefore, an overall 
depiction of discretion is lacking.  
The majority of the findings from this research are conflicting despite the 
similarity of their research designs.  Bernstein et al. (1977) analyzed all persons 
whose most severe charge at first court presentation was second or third degree 
robbery in a major metropolitan city in New York state in order to assess what degree 
of the response to criminal is accounted for by factors other than the alleged act.  This 
analysis focused on reductions within the context of a guilty plea. They used a 
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dependent variable representing the magnitude of the reduction relative to the 
absolute reduction possible and found that older defendants were more likely to 
receive reductions. Although they found no main effects for gender, Bernstein et al. 
(1977) found no significant race effect in their sample of defendants who pled guilty 
with a charge reduction at their first court presentation, but found negative race 
effects in their sample of defendants whose cases were not disposed of at their first 
court presentation.  In this situation, blacks were more likely to fare worse in the 
magnitude of their charge reduction.  Bernstein et al. (1977) also found that 
“defendants with prior arrests and convictions do better than those with no prior 
arrests, but less well than those with arrests but no convictions.” (p.375).
Holmes et al. (1987) focused on burglary and robbery statutes that terminated 
through guilty pleas in Delaware County and Pima County.  In addition to controlling 
for legally relevant variables, one benefit of this research is that it also controlled for 
some evidence characteristics such as eyewitness identification and confession.  The 
dependent variable in this research was an interval scale representing no reduction, 
reduced to lesser felony, or reduced to misdemeanor.  In Delaware County the only 
significant impact by an extralegal variable on charge reduction was being black, but 
the influence was positive, which went against the authors’ hypothesis.  In Pima 
County, none of the extralegal variables had direct effects on charge reduction.  
Interestingly, prior convictions had no direct effect on charge reductions in either 
county.
Albonetti (1992) also investigated burglary and robbery cases, but looked at 
the decision to reduce charges at the initial screening stage in cases from Jacksonville.  
15
Additionally, she used a binary dependent variable representing a reduction from 
felony to misdemeanor.  She was also able to control for the strength of evidence.  
Albonetti’s main effects found that younger defendants were less likely to receive 
reductions and prior convictions increased the likelihood of charge reductions, 
however no main effects for race and gender were found.  Albonetti (1982) also 
looked at the interaction of offense with various variables, in which only offense X 
weapon yielded significant results.  However, the only interaction between offense 
and a defendant characteristic was involved age.  No interactions concerning race or 
gender were investigated.
Farnworth and Teske (1995) looked at interactions more closely among theft and 
assault cases in California.  They found that females with no prior record were more 
likely than similar males to receive charge reductions and that there was a greater 
likelihood of charges dropping from assault to non-assault for white female 
defendants then among minority females.  Also, African-American males were seen 
to be particularly disadvantaged compared to other groups (white and Hispanic males 
and females) in receiving charge reductions. It is also interesting to note that severity 
of arrest charge had no impact on charge reduction and that whether or not a charge 
reduction took place did have a significant impact on the final disposition, but this 
effect varied by gender.  
Despite the fact that there is some agreement among the results of these 
studies, there is undeniable discord as well.  What is hard to figure out is if these 
differences are due to methodological issues, district/offense specific processes, or 
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differential processing across groups which may be influencing the overall main 
effects.  
C. Sentencing Literature
Much more recent and methodologically rigorous research exists which analyzes 
judicial discretion at the sentencing phase of a case and the impact of extralegal 
factors on sentence severity in a case.  This literature can be used as a base model for 
similar research needed on prosecutorial discretion since the repercussions of 
prosecutorial discretion are manifested in sentencing decisions.  Although there are 
some inconsistencies, consistently this literature accounts for sentencing guidelines 
and finds both main effects and interactions among the extralegal factors of age, 
gender, and race, showing differential treatment of stereotypical criminal offenders 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Albonetti, 1997; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001; Spohn 
& Holleran, 2000).  Albonetti (1997) looked at the impact of extralegal factors on 
sentencing severity under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and found main effects 
of illegitimate factors.  Specifically, she found that females receive less severe 
sentences than males, non-U.S. citizens receive harsher sentences than U.S. citizens, 
black and Hispanic defendants receive more stringent sentences than whites, and 
defendants with a high school education received more lenient sentences than those 
without.  While Albonetti’s (1997) research took place after the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, it only evaluated drug offenses.  
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer (1998) added another component to this body of 
literature by accounting for interactions among extralegal variables, suggesting that 
defendants that have multiple disadvantages (based on stereotypes) will fare much 
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worse in the system.  While Steffensmeier et al. (1998) found main effects for race, 
gender, and age, they also found that the magnitude of these effects vary across 
different age-race-gender groups.  For example, age is more influential in the 
sentencing of male defendants, race is more influential among younger males than 
older males, and young, black, males receive the most severe sentences compared to 
all other race-age-gender category (Steffensmeier et. al, 1998).  This research 
suggests that only evaluating main effects masks the variation and impact of these 
illegitimate factors.  
Spohn and Holleran (2000) responded to Steffensmeier et al. (1998) by replicating 
their study using three jurisdictions (as opposed to one) and expanding the analysis to 
incorporate Hispanics and employment status as other extralegal factors.  Whereas 
Steffensmeier et al (1998) found consistent results across the dependant variables of 
an in/out decision for incarceration and sentence length, Spohn and Holleran’s (2000) 
research only coincided with the previous literature for in/out decisions.  Their 
research did find main effects of their extralegal variables, including Hispanic and 
employment status, along with interactive effects.  While the majority of Spohn and 
Holleran’s (2000) findings mirror Steffensmeir et al. (1998), they did find larger age 
effects among females than males.  Additionally, they concluded that Hispanic males, 
like blacks, are treated more harshly than whites and that this effect is even more 
substantial among young black and young Hispanic males, suggesting that the 
attribution process may differ between certain groups.  Spohn and Holleran (2000) 
conclude by stating that in “all three jurisdictions, tests for interactions between our 
four key variables revealed significant effects that were masked in the additive 
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models.” (p.301). Steffensmeir and Demuth (2001) also investigated the effect of 
being Hispanic and found that Hispanic defendants are the subgroup most at risk for 
severe penalties.  These findings held true across the in/out decision and length of 
imprisonment.  
While this sentencing research highlights that under sentencing guidelines, which 
were implemented to reduce judicial discretion, disparities are still widespread, they 
are still only looking at the final stage of the process.  Wilmot and Spohn (2004) 
recognize that specifically under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines which allow for 
relevant conduct, the prosecutor’s charging decisions can be very influential on 
sentencing outcomes because they affect the information that gets in the hands of the 
judge.  Despite the fact that all defendants in their sample were only convicted of one 
offense, they found that those initially charged with more than one count in the 
original indictment were sentenced more harshly than those only charged with one 
count.  Additionally, they found that blacks, men, and non-citizens, fared worse when 
observing the odds of a downward departure (Wilmot and Spohn, 2004).  Their 
research lends credence to the idea that prosecutorial decisions are also influential and 
need to be investigated.   
Implications of Charge Reduction Research
Charge reduction research brings a lot of issues forward that need to be 
continually addressed with updated research, especially in light of the fact that much 
of the existing research has conflicting findings.  In addition, it is important to 
evaluate this research after new policies and guidelines are implemented, which is 
one of the primary reasons for the current research. There are two specific 
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implications that are worth mentioning to highlight the importance of this research; its 
impact on sentencing decisions and the legitimacy of the system.
A plethora of research has been done on discretion in sentencing decisions.  
However, this research mainly focuses on judicial discretion because judges have the 
ultimate say in sentencing decisions.   As previously mentioned, it is also necessary to 
acknowledge the impact that prosecutorial discretion has on the severity of sentencing 
outcomes. After all,  it is the discretionary decision of the prosecutor on top of the 
discretionary decision of the judge within the sentencing guidelines that produces the 
final sentence (Free, Jr., 2002; Albonetti, 1990). Since the system allows for 
discretionary decisions to pile on top of each other, it is plausible to see that the final 
disposition of a case may not be reflective of the actual crime committed (Griffin, 
2001).  Collectively, the findings above along with Griffin’s (2001) comments 
referenced earlier make it quite clear that prosecutorial discretion is influential even at 
the sentencing stage of a case, but in order to truly understand its impact we must 
uncover what factors influence the original discretionary decisions, specifically 
beginning with charging.
Another major problem that charge reduction research highlights is a loss of 
legitimacy within the system.  Wright and Miller (2003) highlight this issue through 
the impact of charge reductions on public perceptions of the system.  They stress that 
the main problem with charge reductions is transparency.  During charge reductions 
the disputed facts are not presented in open court or any public forum, therefore, the 
quality of the ultimate conviction is hard to determine.  This is especially true when 
dealing with charge reductions in initial charges.  When a prosecutor files a charge, 
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the public and the defense are led to believe, based on charging guidelines, that the 
charges “reflect the government’s reasoned judgment about what the defendant has 
done, and what social labels and consequences should attach.” (Wright and Miller, 
2003).  However, when these initial filing charges change, after nonpublic 
negotiations, doubt is created about whether or not the defendant is getting what 
he/she deserves.  This point should be increasingly alarming in light of the above 
research that shows that often people with prior convictions, who are clearly repeat 
offenders, often receive downward departures.  Therefore, in the eyes of the public, 
negotiations go on behind closed doors and end with serious offenders being offered 
charge reductions and in turn receiving more lenient sentencing.  These actions go 
against all the principles of federal prosecution outlined above.
In addition, research highlights even more reasons, conflicting with the principles 
of federal prosecution, that prosecutors initiate charge reductions that detract from 
legitimacy within the system.  “Prosecutorial success, which is defined in terms of 
achieving a favorable ratio of convictions to acquittals, is crucial to a prosecutor’s 
prestige, upward mobility within the office, and entrance into the political arena.” 
(Albonetti, 1987).  Considering the fact that in 2001, 96.9% of all convictions in the 
federal system were secured through guilty pleas (Wright and Miller, 2003), it seems 
likely that charge reductions ending in pleas may be quite an incentive for the 
professional advancement of prosecutors. It is also possible for the cases that do go to 
trial that prosecutors are reducing charges to those that will be easier to win (despite 
the actual crime committed) in order to boost their statistics.  This may seem like a 
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pessimistic point of view, but qualitative research through interviews with 
prosecutors and judges seems to support this notion (Kingsnorth et al., 2002).  
Critics of Wright and Miller’s transparency argument state that the reduction is 
justified because it produces a more certain payoff for the prosecution and the public 
(Wright and Miller, 2003). However, this is a payoff may not be one the public is 
willing to accept.  This question goes back to Campbell and Bemporad’s (2003) 
caution of whether the benefits of a charge reduction are “real or illusory” (p.12). 
Research that has been done on prosecutors’ decisions to proceed with a case as a 
violation of probation or to file a new criminal charge (which could be compared to a 
charge reduction) shows support for Wright and Miller by illustrating that prosecutors 
are willing to take the easier road.  Kingsnorth et al. (2002) interviewed prosecutors 
about their reasons for only charging a violation of probation versus going after a new 
criminal charge that would result in a more severe punishment and many of the 
prosecutors’ responses appeared quite selfish.  “If you have some factual problem, or 
something a jury might look askance at, you go PV only.  It’s hard to lose a PV; It’s 
easier to make our case.  It doesn’t get me anything going to trial and risking an 
acquittal.” (Kingsnorth et al., 2002, p. 571 and 560).  Defense attorneys also state 
hesitation with this practice because they fear that in some cases prosecutors are using 
this method to circumvent evidence problems (Kingsnorth et al., 2002).  This 
commentary clearly goes against the USAM principles for federal prosecution 
guidelines that in no way should “the possible effect of the decision on the attorney’s 
own professional circumstances” (DOJ, 2000, §9-27.260) weigh into their charging 
decisions.
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Conclusion
Reviewing this research has highlighted substantial concerns in the area of 
prosecutorial discretion, specifically with charge reductions.  “Prosecutors mention 
two factors which most often influence the exercise of discretion: the characteristics 
of the defendant and the circumstances of the event.” (Neubauer, 1974).  
Unfortunately, some of the factors within these broad areas admitted to by 
prosecutors are factors that are not supposed to influence the decision (e.g. race).  
Researchers feel that charge bargaining gives prosecutors too much leniency and 
allows them to treat similarly situated defendants differently (Wright and Miller, 
2003).  It seems obvious from the research that there is very little official review of 
these decisions, despite public concerns.  Given this fact, the intentions of a 
prosecutor can matter more than the facts or law relevant to a case (Wright and 
Miller, 2003).  Wright and Miller (2003) stress that we currently have a system in 
which guilty pleas represent “prosecutorial domination” and we are in need of a
system where prosecutors who depart from the guidelines by overcharging or 
reducing charges for their own benefit will be sanctioned in some way.  They make a 
plea for a system in which “aggressive prosecutorial screening, including sharp 
restrictions on charge bargains, improves on the administrative structures now in 
place.  The practice makes prosecutors more accountable, to one another and to all of 
us.” (Wright and Miller, 2003, p.1418).   In 1979 Senator Edward T. Kennedy 
expressed these same sediments by stating a need to establish some guideline system 
for prosecutors, using sentencing guidelines as a foundation in which to build similar 
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reforms to curb prosecutorial discretion (Wilmot and Spohn, 2004).  Unfortunately, it 
is quite obvious that his call for reform has still not been sufficiently answered.
The reviewed research should cause concern for all.  Overwhelmingly studies 
have shown that the charging decision has major effects on the criminal justice 
process.  However, much of the research is based on interview and observation data.  
Although these studies produce valuable information, it is largely “impressionistic” 
(Neubauer, 1974).  In addition, when concrete findings are developed through 
quantitative research, the findings are often conflicting.  In order for review of 
prosecutorial discretion to take place, the true impact of it on the outcome of cases 
needs to be determined through more research with conclusive findings.  In reality, 
although the research evaluated here did not replicate findings on specific factors, 
they all concluded in one way or another that discretion was prevalent in an alarming 
way. In addition, the research has to have empirical improvements to those that were 
done prior to policy changes.  
The current research is hoping to accomplish this goal by using a large sample of 
federal data that includes multiple districts, multiple offenses, and investigating 
differential effects between different groups of individuals.  Unfortunately, there is 
not a lot of overlap in the existing research on prosecutorial discretion and charge 
reductions because it has not been substantially evaluated. However, similar research 
that looks at decision making across the system supports some of the findings in the 
charge reduction literature, and emphasizes the importance of looking at all stages of 
processing.  Specifically LaFree  (1985) looked at the effect of race throughout the 
processing of rape cases and found that the victim-defendant racial composition was 
24
influential across many stages of case processing, including charge seriousness, 
felony screening, sentence type, place of incarceration, and sentence length.  
Additionally, death penalty studies also highlight certain aspects of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Paternoster (1984) comments that states regularly pay attention to race in 
the decision to seek the death penalty. He further comments on the lack of legal 
checks on this prosecutorial decision and likelihood that this discrimination may be 
exacerbated at later stages of death penalty decision making.   Sorenson and Wallace 
(1999) find similar results and conclude that “racial disparity exists in the pretrial 
stages of decision making for potential capital murder cases” even after controlling 
for legally relevant variables (p. 575).  This suggests that the use of race is 
unwarranted and discriminatory. 
 While this research focuses specifically on race and specific types of processing 
(rape and capital cases) it supports the idea that extralegal factors are being utilized in 
earlier stages of processing and that their effects are influential in later stages.  
Therefore, they lend credibility to the idea of investigating other irrelevant variables 
and intermediate processes that occur after the decision to  prosecute or seek death-
eligible charges, but before seeking specific sentences, that have so far been neglected 
in the literature, such as charge bargaining.  It is plausible to believe that if extralegal 
factors are being used by prosecutors and other courtroom actors prior to and
following the charge bargaining stage of case processing, that they are likely to be 
influential during that stage as well.  Hopefully the current research will help bridge 
the gap between the stages of processing and add to the methodologically sound and
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current research on what factors influence a prosecutor’s decision to proceed with 
charge reductions.
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Chapter 2: The Current Research
Collectively, these bodies of literature illuminate a need for updating discretion 
literature in light of sentencing guidelines while expanding it beyond judicial 
discretion on sentencing outcomes.  I intend to apply the mechanisms of the 
sentencing literature to the importance of charging literature and the need for review 
of prosecutorial discretion.  I hypothesize that prosecutors allow extralegal factors 
(age, gender, race and ethnicity) to influence their decision for using charge 
reductions, net of legally relevant controls.    More importantly, based on attribution 
and focal concerns perspectives, I will test the hypothesis that the effects of these 
variables vary across different sub-samples and that analyzing all defendants 
collectively masks inconsistencies in the illegitimate use of these different variables.  
Looking for differential effects of extralegal factors has been neglected in a lot of the 
existing research, but their importance is noted (Free, Jr., 2002;  Steffensmeier et al., 
1998; Farnworth and Teske, Jr., 1995; Albonetti, 1990).  Based on the previously 
reviewed literature, one would expect defendants with multiple disadvantages, 
specifically young, black or Hispanic, males to be least likely to receive reductions if 
the process guiding charge reductions is similar to that influencing sentencing 
decisions.  Finding that multiple disadvantages are most influential supports the idea 
that the causal attribution process differs across different groups.
This research is a quantitative assessment of the public and professional 
suspicions regarding prosecutorial discretion with a large and diverse sample, with 
meaningful conclusions/implications regardless of the statistical results.  If the results 
show that extralegal factors are influential in the prosecutors’ decision-making 
27
process, the public and professional suspicions will be confirmed.  In turn, this 
research will add to the body of evidence supporting stronger policy implementation 
addressing the abuse of prosecutorial discretion.  Oppositely, if the hypothesis is not 
supported, and null findings result, it will add to the findings that discount abuse of
discretion through insignificant effects.  Although null findings do not sufficiently 
disprove the hypotheses, they will add to the literature that does not significantly 
support them, and therefore, may put the public at ease with their fear that abuse of 
discretion is widespread.  Either way, this research helps to put prosecutorial 
discretion in the spotlight and make prosecutors publicly accountable for their 
actions.  
The current research seeks to fill a void in the literature by looking at differential 
processing as well as bring this research topic up to date through reevaluation of main 
effects.  After all, the majority of research looking at charge reductions and the 
factors influencing the probability of a defendant receiving a charge reduction were 
conducted in the 1970’s and 1980’s (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et at., 1987; 
Albonetti, 1987).  Although there have been a few more recent assessments of this 
topic, they are offense type specific (Albonetti, 1992), whereas the current research is 
not.  In light of new policies and guidelines that have been implemented since the 
majority of research on this topic has been done, it is important to update the 
literature and uncover the current status of prosecutorial discretion.  
The biggest improvement upon prior research that the current research will 
achieve is to assess prosecutorial discretion in charge bargaining within the Federal 
system after the implementation of sentencing guidelines. While some believe that 
28
using sentencing guidelines inhibits prosecutorial discretion from being abused, the 
skepticism is growing that the guidelines simply displace discretion from the judges 
to the prosecutors.  The charging research that has been conducted since the 
implementation of guidelines has been done on a state level and is jurisdiction 
specific.  Alternatively, this research will evaluate the federal system, which has 
rarely been assessed since the U.S. Sentencing Guideline, except briefly by Nagel and 
Schulhofer (1992) in their section on plea agreements.   This research strives to give 
an overall picture of the abuse of discretion through the use of extralegal factors 
across the entire system, which is why it encompasses all jurisdictions and offense 
types.  This research can then serve as a baseline model for the average disparities 
throughout the Federal system, which is meant to be uniform throughout the country.  
Although some research suggests that aggregation is problematic (Albonetti, 2003)
and that focal concerns are also subject to local levels of interpretation (Ulmer and 
Johnson, 2004), the USAM strictly lists which factors are not to weigh in the 
prosecutors decision to initiate or decline certain charges, which is why this research 
looks at the total system.  These factors include the defendant’s “race, religion, sex, 
national origin, or political association, activities or beliefs; the attorney’s own 
personal feelings concerning the person, the person’s associates, or the victim; or the 
possible affect of the decision on the attorney’s own professional circumstances” 
(DOJ, 2000, 9-27.260).  Despite the prohibition of these factors on paper, existing 
research finds otherwise in practice, specifically with the extralegal factors of race 
and age (Albonetti, 1992; Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987).  
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Doing this evaluation within the Federal system is especially important because it 
will help to evaluate a policy that is believed to prevent the above practices from 
occurring (through the guidelines).  It is argued that charge bargaining is undertaken 
to ultimately influence the sentence a person will receive.  Some research suggests 
that whereas guidelines may limit judicial discretion, it increases the power of the 
prosecutor through charging negotiations, specifically through the loopholes 
previously mentioned from Tonry (1996).  These loopholes are exceptionally 
important in plea negotiations because they are rarely overseen by judges or 
supervising prosecutors.  
The current research will focus on only plea bargains for two reasons.  First, this 
research uses the change between filing and disposition offenses to represent the 
amount of leniency a prosecutor is willing to give in ultimate sentencing.  Because 
there would be no way to differentiate whether a plea was offered and rejected in trial 
cases, only negotiations that took place will be used.  In addition, using pleas is a 
much easier way to isolate the discretion of a prosecutor and the effect on sentencing.  
Johnson (2003) stresses that the mode of conviction (i.e. trial or plea) in a case 
determines whose discretion is most prominent; allowing one to evaluate how much 
prosecutorial discretion is involved.  In contrast to jury or bench trials, Johnson 
(2003) points out that when dealing with negotiated pleas prosecutorial discretion is 
more prevalent than judicial discretion.  “Because prosecutors utilize their own 
judgment when negotiating sentencing recommendations in exchange for guilty pleas, 
and because judges almost always adhere to these recommendations, prosecutors 
exercise more sentencing discretion than judges for these cases.” (Johnson, 2003, 
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p.509).  This is crucial to note because often these decisions lead to departures from 
sentencing guidelines in which judges cite plea bargain as their reason for departure.  
Johnson’s findings showed that negotiating a plea decreased the odds of an upward 
departure by 20% and increase the odds of a downward departure in sentencing by 
12%.  Therefore, it becomes quite apparent that the prosecutor’s discretion in 
handling negotiated pleas and charge reductions does have an impact on the final 
disposition and severity of a case. This sentencing research also found that more 
criminally experienced offenders are more likely to receive downward departures 
(Johnson, 2003), which supplements the finding that people with prior convictions are 
given more favorable charge reductions. These influences are especially important 
within the Federal system because this system allows people to be sentenced based on 
relevant conduct, which allows movement within a guideline range based on 
circumstances not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is these loopholes used by 
prosecutors that allow movement outside of the guidelines.  Therefore, focusing on 
the Federal system, unlike most prior research, adds something significant to the 
field.  
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Chapter 3: Methods
Data 
Secondary, archival data will be used for this research.  The subjects are taken 
from the Federal Justice Statistics Program public database for the fiscal year 2001.1
The subjects for the current analysis were obtained by linking the Administrative 
Office of the US Courts (AOUSC) database with the US Sentencing Commission 
(USSC) database.  The link took place using identification numbers in the two 
datasets, but no other identifiers are available in the data.  Therefore, there is no way 
to identify who the specific individuals are.  This link provided information on all 
federal defendants whose cases were terminated in the year 2001, resulting in 
approximately 77,000 individuals.  Because this analysis is focusing on charge 
reductions resulting from pleas data reduction took place in order to eliminate 
irrelevant cases.  Subjects were dropped whose cases resulted in a dismissal (11%) 
and those whose cases terminated as a result of a trial (6%). Although some may 
consider a dismissal of charges the ultimate charge reduction, these cases were not 
able to be analyzed because they did not exist in the USSC database, which is where 
the primary independent variables of interest were located.  Therefore, none of the 
defendant characteristics were available for the cases resulting in a dismissal. Another 
4% of cases were dropped because they were death penalty cases which go through a 
very different process than non-death eligible cases, specifically close oversight and 
1
 Although the Adminstrative Office of the US Courts is collected by the calendar year, when it is 
combined with the US Sentencing Commission in the Federal Justice Statistics Program, an adjustment 
is made to reconcile the difference and uses all cases for the fiscal year from both databases (Adams & 
Motivans, 2003).
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approval by the Attorney General for  plea agreements (DOJ, 2000, 9-10.100).  
Lastly, 18% of the original sample was dropped because of reporting differences 
between the AOUSC and the USSC.  The AOUSC has defendants in their database 
for each individual case, whereas the USSC only has a defendant listed for each 
sentencing event (Adams & Motivans, 2003).  For example, if an individual was 
sentenced on more than one case in the same sentencing hearing, that defendant 
would appear in the USSC database once but the AOUSC more than once.  Therefore, 
to avoid duplicate information, only cases with a USSC ID were used. The sample of 
relevant cases consists of 47,843 defendants.2
Dependent Variables
The outcome of interest in this research is charge reduction.  A charge reduction 
in this study is defined in a very strict manner.  Based on the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines there are ranges of sentences that can be given based on one’s criminal 
history and the committed offense.  However, relevant conduct permits movement 
within these ranges.   Due to the fact that statutory limits trump the guidelines and 
relevant conduct cannot move a sentence beyond the statutory limit, a charge 
reduction for this study is defined by the amount of change in the statutory maximum 
between the filing offenses and the pled offenses. This is used to represent the amount 
of leniency the prosecutor is willing to give the defendant which can ultimately play 
out in sentencing.  
In computation of the differences between the two groups of charges it was also 
necessary to account for concurrent versus consecutive sentences.  Consecutive 
2
 Due to the large sample size, some variables are found to be significant, although their influence is 
not very large substantively (i.e. odds ratios of 1.00 despite statistical significance).
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sentences are rare in the federal system and are only used when mandated by statute 
(US Sentencing Guidelines §5G.2, 2004).  It was necessary to account for them in 
order to prevent  the cases in which prosecutors may increase the number of charges 
against a defendant, but use less serious charges that would add up to the same 
punishment from being considered reductions.  Therefore, for cases in which 
consecutive sentences were mandated the maximum sentence of each convicted 
charge was added together.  In cases involving concurrent sentences, the statutory 
maximum for the most serious charges were used.  Also, some may argue that a 
reduction in the number of charges should constitute a charge reduction because the 
number of convicted charges can influence one’s criminal history category for 
sentencing and a reduction in the number of convicted charges can be beneficial.  
Whereas this is true, the influence of the criminal history score is something that 
would be necessary to evaluate if looking at the final sentences received. In addition, 
there was no way to determine whether this practice has occurred in a defendant’s 
previous cases, which would also affect the current case.  While this could be an area 
of interest worth investigating, for the purpose of the current research, the immediate 
effect of a reduction or increase in the number of charges on the potential maximum 
sentence is captured within the dependant variables by accounting for consecutive 
and concurrent sentences. 
Two dependant variables of interest will be analyzed in this study.  First, a binary 
variable looking at whether or not a charge reduction took place.  Second, the 
magnitude of the charge change will be analyzed. This dependent variable is a 
continuous variable that represents the difference (in years) between the maximum 
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potential sentence based on the filing charges and the maximum potential sentence 
based on the pled charges.  Therefore, a positive coefficient would actually represent 
a disadvantage, corresponding to an increase in the severity difference score which is 
indicative of less of a reduction in the potential sentence. 
Independent Variables
1. Age is used as a continuous variable in all of the statistical models.
2. Gender is incorporated by using a dummy variable for male.
3. Race is operationalized through a series of dummy variables representing 
Whites, Blacks, and Other Races (encompassing American Indian/Alaskan 
Natives (36%), Asian/Pacific Islanders (59%), multi-racial (3%), and other 
(2%)).
4. Ethnicity is operationalized through a dummy variable for Hispanic. 
Because this is an ethnicity variable, there are members of the sample who 
are White-Hispanic, Black-Hispanic, and Other-Hispanic.3
The above independent variables were chosen as the primary independent 
variables of interest due to the long legacy of literature that documents their 
influences on case processing (see literature review).  However, some recent research 
has begun to look at other extralegal variables that may influence courtroom actors’ 
perceptions of defendants, for example, employment status (Spohn and Holleran, 
2000).  Because these variables are emerging as possible influences the decision was
made to included them as variables to control for any possible influence they may 
3
 Although it was originally planned to use dummy variables for each of these race/ethnicity
combinations, a large amount of missing data on the race variables left a large number of Hispanics 
that were unable to be classified into a specific race category.  Therefore, the decision was made to 
analyze race and ethnicity separately.
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have on the decision process and to better isolate the influence of the independent 
variables that have been repeatedly shown to have an influence.
Control Variables
The extralegal variables that were included as control variables include some 
defendant characteristics.  Specifically, the defendant’s marital status, operationalized 
by single, living together but not legally married, married, divorced/separated, and 
widow; dependents which is incorporated as a binary dummy variable4; and education 
level represented in dummy variables for less than HS, HS grad, GED, some college, 
college grad/graduate school, or other education (trade school or military).  
Unfortunately, employment variables were not available in the data.  There were also 
control variables included that were case characteristics.  One of these variables was 
whether or not the defendant was a sole defendant. This variable was included 
because cases involving multiple defendants could be influential in one’s plea 
agreement if they receive a substantial assistance departure.  Additionally, the number 
of filing and final charges were controlled as well as the district in which the case 
took place, operationalized by a series of dummy variables. There is some debate 
over the presence of district level variation, but research suggests that case processing 
does vary significantly by district (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). 5  It should be noted 
that type of counsel was intended to be used as a control, as is seen in a lot of 
charging and sentencing literature.  However, the missing data on this variable was so 
4
 This variable was modified from its original form which included the number of dependents into a 
binary variable because there was a substantial amount of defendants who were classified as having 
dependents, but were unsure of the number.
5
 Analysis of the models without the district variables revealed substantively different results, therefore 
it was necessary to control for any district variation by incorporating dummy variables.
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large (40%) that the decision was made to eliminate the variable in the interest of 
keeping a large sample size.6
In addition to these extralegal factors, it is necessary to note that there are legal 
factors that prosecutors take into account when assessing a case, therefore, these 
factors must also be controlled for7.  Therefore, the legal controls included in this 
research include: the defendant’s criminal history operationalized by levels I through 
VI based on the USSC guidelines; offense type which is a categorical variable by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics encompassing violent, other prisoner, property, drug, 
weapons, or immigration offenses; and offense operationalized by the Administrative 
Office of the US Courts’ severity codes. 
Analytical Framework
Logistic regression will be used in order to test the hypothesis that extralegal 
factors are influential in prosecutors’ decisions for offering charge reductions.  This 
test is necessary for this research due to the binary nature of the dependent variable.  
In addition to an assessment of the statistical significance of the illegitimate variables, 
odds ratios will also be obtained and interpreted.  Additionally, Ordinary Least 
Squares regression will be used to analyze the magnitude of change between the 
filing and plea.  Along with running these tests on the entire sample, they will also be 
run on sub-samples in order to compare the effects of the extralegal variables across 
different groups. The sub-samples were chosen based on the conflicting findings of 
6
 The analysis was run with type of counsel included in the models with a dummy variable for missing 
and the substantive results of the analysis did not change significantly.  However, type of counsel was 
significant in many of the models, with t-values as large as -4.80.
7
 Steffensmeier and Demuth (2001) discuss the lack of adequate legal controls in prior research which 
only controls for type of offense or offense severity, and stress that both controls are necessary in 
conjunction with criminal history.
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race, ethnicity, gender, and age main effects in the literature.  The models will 
compare the following samples: Whites, Blacks, and Other; Hispanics and non-
Hispanics; males and females; ages 17-29, ages 30-49, and age 50+.8
In order to prepare the above variables for inclusion in the regression equation, 
some of the original formats needed to be altered.  Therefore, any categorical variable 
whose numerical value does not represent rank was turned into a series of binary 
variables, with a reference group.  For example, the race variable was changed into 3 
dummy variables with White as the reference group (Black and other races).  
Criminal history was kept as a rank order variable, age was kept as continuous, and 
binary variables were retained in their original form.  Variables were prepared in this 
manner so that regression coefficients had meaning.  
Reliability and Validity
There are potential problems with reliability in this research due to the use of 
official data.  Because this data is collected from each circuit of the Federal Court 
system, there is the possibility for a lack of uniformity in recording and reporting 
practices across courts.  Therefore, one potential threat to internal validity may be a 
slight selection bias based on courts only reporting certain case types.  However, 
document submission rates were obtained for the USSC data and every district had a
submission rate of at least 95.5% (USSC, 2001), therefore a strong selection bias is 
not likely.  Unfortunately, there is also no way to unveil selection bias that may have 
occurred at earlier decision points (e.g. arrests), which could be another form of bias 
within this sample. Although controls are being used to make the independent 
8
 After graphing age against the continuous dependent variable, no visible tipping point was found, 
therefore the age categories used in previous literature were implemented (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).
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variable of interest the only difference between the individuals, if there are omitted 
variables that affect both the independent and dependent variables (e.g. employment) 
there will be estimation bias.  Other threats to validity are not a problem with this 
research because there is no pre and post tests, the sample was preexisting, and the 
causal order would not be in question because the independent variables of interest 
precede the criminal cases by nature.  It is also important to recognize that Federal 
and State defendants are processed differently; therefore this research can only be 
generalized to Federal defendants.  However, the use of Federal data increases 
external validity because the sample includes defendants from all circuits, 
representing all areas of the country.
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Chapter 4: Results
Descriptive Statistics
Before analyzing the influences of different variables on the outcomes of interest, 
it is important to look at the frequencies of the primary variables in order to establish 
their prevalence within the sample.  Table 1 shows the frequencies and percentages 
for the independent variables, which also indicate the sub-samples of interest, as well 
as the two dependent variables.9
9
 District variation was not a primary interest of this research.  The set of dummy variables for each 
federal district were only included to incorporate fixed-effects.  All results reported are net of district 
fixed effects and the specific coefficients for each district are reported in Appendix A. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Name Descriptive Statistics
Logistic Regression n,% reduction 5646 11.80
OLS Regression n, M(SD) severity difference 47843 -2.28(10.45)
Age n, M(SD) Age 46667 33.98(10.68)
Gender n, % Male 40909 85.54
Female* 6915 14.46
Race n, % white* 31358 68.41
Black 12834 28.00
other race 1645 3.59
Ethnicity n,% hispanic 18294 38.29
non-hispanic* 29478 61.71
Offense Type  n,% violent offense* 1824 3.81
prisoner offense 15 0.03
property offense 11137 23.28
drug offense 19158 40.04
public order offense 3314 6.93
weapon offense 4261 8.91
immigration offense 8134 17.00
Severity Control n, M(SD) severity of offense 47843 7.34(3.08)
Criminal History n, M(SD) criminal history 46522 2.37(1.69)
Sole Defendant Case n,% sole defendant 33106 69.20
# of Filing Charges n, M(SD) # of filing charges 47843 1.82(1.14)
# of Final Charges n ,M(SD) # of final charges 47843 2.02(1.27)
Children  n, % Kids 27027 61.12
Marital Status n, % Single* 17075 39.11
married 13989 32.04
living together 5447 12.47
divorced/separated 6903 15.81
Widow 250 0.57
Education n,% less than HS* 19348 44.46
HS grad 9037 20.77
GED 4437 10.20
some college 7435 17.09
college grad/grad school 2757 6.34
other education 501 1.15
* Reference Category
From this table a clearer picture of the sample being analyzed emerges.  This 
shows that the federal defendants utilized for this study are 86% male.  It is not 
surprising to find a comparable amount of individuals between the ages of 17-29 and 
30-49 (40% and 48% respectively), but only 12% of the sample over the age of 50, 
since most people desist from crime.  Racially, the majority of the sample is White 
(68%), followed by 28% Black and only 4% other.  Hispanics make up 38% of the 
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sample.  The binary dependent variable shows that 12% of the sample received 
charge reductions and the continuous dependent variable shows that the average 
difference between the maximum penalty possible from filing charges versus pled 
charges is representative of a sentence reduction of about 2 years and three months.10
The driving force behind this research is to uncover processing disparities 
within the Federal system with regards to charge reductions.  The statistical analyzes 
below reveal support for both of the primary research hypotheses.  Not only do they 
show that there is an overall influence of extralegal variables at the charging stage, 
but they also reveal that the effect of these variables change in significance and 
magnitude between different sub-samples.  These results suggest differential 
treatment of defendants when offering charge reductions in the Federal system.    
Bivariate Correlations
Before beginning to build regression models the bivariate relationships of the 
independent variables of interest with the dependent variables should be assessed.  
Table 2 shows the correlation of each independent variable with each of the 
dependent variables.  Similar to other charge reduction literature (Bernstein et al., 
1977), these correlations are extremely small.  Because there are such inconsistencies 
in the prior research and because the current study uses data that has not previously 
been used for this type of analysis, the hypotheses do not include specific directional 
expectations for these variables. However, looking at these bivariate relationships 
does highlight some interesting associations.  First of all, it is comforting to see that 
10
 Tests for normality showed that the dependent variable is slightly left skewed, which is to be 
expected because the occurrence of charging upgrades (1.4%) is much less likely than reductions 
(11.8%).  However, the analyses were also run using the log values in order to correct for skewness, 
and the results did not differ, suggesting that skewness was not problematic in the analyses.
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the majority of the legal variables such as offense severity and many of the offense
type variables are the most highly correlated.  This suggests that they are the most 
influential factors.  What is puzzling is that the direction of offense severity is 
opposite what most would say is intuitively expected.  Most would think that as 
offense severity increases the likelihood of receiving a reduction would lessen 
because people would want to punish more severe offenses more harshly.  However, 
a correlation of .171 suggests the opposite. This may be the case due to the research 
on guideline departures which suggest that some courtroom officials are 
uncomfortable with the punitive sentences mandated by the guidelines for offenses 
with high severity scores (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002).  Therefore, in order to avoid the 
harsh penalties, prosecutors may reduce charges in order to change the guidelines, 
whereas, prosecutors are not in conflict with the guidelines for lesser offenses.   Also, 
there are some extralegal variables, specifically male, that have correlations that are 
stronger than the legal variables, which may be indicative of abuse of discretion.  
However, this suspicion cannot be confirmed without controlling for other factors.  
These simple bivariate relationships are not sufficient, however, especially 
since some of the contradictory findings. Based on the operationalization of the 
continuous dependent variable described above, it would be expected that the 
direction of correlation for the magnitude of charge change would be the opposite of 
the likelihood of charge reduction.  While this is true for most of the variables, it is 
not for all, suggesting that other factors are affecting these relationships.  Therefore, 
multivariate statistical modeling needs to be used in order to isolate the actual 
relationship between these independent variables with the dependent variables by 
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rigorously controlling for the effect of the other independent variables.  Therefore, 
this research turns to more advanced statistical analyses, namely logistic regression 
for the binary outcome and ordinary least squares regression for the continuous 
outcome.
Table 2: Bivariate Correlations
Correlations with Dependent Variables
Independent Variable Likelihood of Charge Reduction Magnitude of Charge Change
Age 0.000 0.025
Male -0.125 0.023
White -0.017 0.007
Black -0.008 -0.006
Other Race 0.133 -0.002
Hispanic 0.031 -0.017
Violent Offense -0.046 0.020
Prisoner Offense -1.000 0.005
Property Offense -0.095 0.073
Drug Offense 0.196 -0.114
Public Order Offense -0.189 0.035
Weapon Offense 0.185 -0.002
Immigration Offense -0.297 0.08
Offense Severity 0.171 -0.208
Criminal History -0.040 0.034
Sole Defendant -0.200 0.077
# of Filing Charges 0.279 -0.217
# of Final Charges 0.265 -0.182
Kids 0.000 -0.008
Single 0.025 -0.011
Married 0.011 0.011
Living Together -0.018 -0.013
Divorced/Separated -0.051 0.014
Widow 0.012 -0.003
Less than HS -0.024 -0.014
HS Graduate 0.013 0.001
GED -0.004 0.000
Some College 0.010 0.005
College/Graduate School 0.002 0.020
Other Education 0.198 -0.006
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Logistic Regression Results
It seems fitting to begin with the simpler question and investigate what factors 
influence whether or not a charge reduction is received.  The full model uses the 
entire sample and includes all of the variables previously described, including the
independent variables of interest, legally relevant variables, and control variables.11
Table 3 shows the results from the full logistic regression model.
Table 3: Logistic Regression Results: Full Model
Variable Coefficient (z) Odds Ratio
Age 0.004* 2.40 1.00
Male -0.377** -8.19 0.69
Black -0.012 -0.26 0.99
Other Race 0.371** 4.09 1.45
Hispanic 0.177** 3.57 1.19
Property Offense 0.524** 5.11 1.69
Drug Offense -0.223* -2.31 0.80
Public Order Offense 0.321** 2.68 1.38
Weapon Offense 0.521** 5.11 1.68
Immigration Offense -0.913** -5.91 0.40
Offense Severity 0.219** 17.95 1.25
Criminal History -0.027* -2.23 0.97
Sole Defendant 0.212** 5.53 1.24
# of Filing Charges 0.327** 14.09 1.39
# of Convicted Charges 0.240** 11.03 1.27
Kids 0.019 0.48 1.02
Married -0.043 -0.87 0.96
Living Together -0.071 -1.24 0.93
Divorced/Separated -0.178** -3.16 0.84
Widow -0.081 -0.36 0.92
High School -0.053 -1.15 0.95
GED -0.056 -0.93 0.95
Some College -0.069 -1.36 0.93
College Grad -0.095 -1.22 0.91
Other Education 0.087 0.60 1.09
Constant -5.077** -16.96 --
 Log likelihood -12022.478
* p< .05, ** p<.01
11
 Prisoner offense dropped out of the logistic regression models due to a lack of variation in the 
variable.
45
This model shows that while being male significantly decreases ones chances of 
receiving a charge reduction, being a race other than Black or White, and being 
Hispanic significantly increases the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction.  
Specifically, only 69 men receive a charge reduction for every 100 women receiving 
a reduction.  Oppositely, for every 100 Whites, 145 Other Race individuals receive a
reduction and 119 Hispanics for every 100 Non-Hispanic receiving a reduction.  
Interestingly, Blacks are no more or less likely than Whites to receive a reduction, 
which goes against stereotypical thinking. It is also worth noting that as anticipated, 
all of the legally relevant variables of offense type, offense severity and criminal 
history are also statistically significant.  These results suggest that as one’s criminal 
history increases, the odds of receiving a reduction decrease, but as the severity of the 
most serious filing charge increases so do the chances of a reduction.  This finding 
compliments the previously provided reason cited from the departure literature.  The 
significantly positive coefficients for the number of filing charges and number of 
convicted charges may also be explained by the departure literature, considering the 
fact that these variables can be influential in determining where a defendant falls on 
the sentencing guideline grid.  Therefore, as these numbers increase charge reductions 
may be more likely in order to avoid overly punitive sentences.
While the overall effects of these variables are interesting alone, the deeper 
question this research seeks to answer is whether the significance and magnitude of 
the effects of the extralegal variables differ across different sub-samples.  In essence, 
does lumping the sample together mask the effects that age, gender, race, and 
ethnicity have on certain groups of individuals?  Therefore, the analyses move to 
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comparisons of the effects of these variables across different groups. This method of 
analysis was chosen to represent a series of tests for statistical interactions since the 
charging literature has not previously acknowledged which interactions would be 
beneficial to specifically test.  Hopefully, these analyses will provide some guidance 
on which interaction terms will be beneficial to include in modeling for future 
research.  Differences across racial groups are the first comparison analyzed.  Table 4 
compares the effects of age, gender, and ethnicity between Blacks, Whites, and other 
racial groups and uncovers a lack of uniformity in the results.  Hispanic is still 
included in the models because it is not being considered a race.  There are 
defendants within each model that are also classified as Hispanic.
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Table 4: Logistic Regression of Race Sub-samples
Black (n= 12,155) White (n= 27,374) Other Race (n=1,372)
Variable Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio
Age 0.002 0.52 1.00 0.005* 2.06 1.01 0.011 1.19 1.01
Male -0.317** -3.62 0.73 -0.385** -6.72 0.68 -0.413 -1.80 0.66
Hispanic -0.100 -0.61 0.90 0.186** 3.32 1.21 -0.122 -0.21 0.89
Property Offense 0.616** 3.28 1.85 0.502** 3.52 1.65 0.690* 2.15 2.00
Drug Offense -0.139 -0.79 0.87 -0.175 -1.29 0.84 -1.228** -3.75 0.29
Public Order Offense 0.248 0.98 1.28 0.292 1.83 1.34 0.921* 2.39 2.51
Weapon Offense 0.609** 3.37 1.84 0.501** 3.44 1.65 0.691 1.82 2.00
Immigration Offense -0.073 -0.17 0.93 -1.021** -5.43 0.36 -1.477 -1.35 0.23
Offense Severity 0.205** 9.24 1.23 0.211** 13.61 1.24 0.365** 6.93 1.44
Criminal History -0.039* -1.97 0.96 -0.007 -0.43 0.99 -0.020 -0.26 0.98
Sole Defendant 0.022 0.31 1.02 0.320** 6.61 1.38 -0.160 -0.77 0.85
# of Filing Charges 0.419** 10.13 1.52 0.292** 9.86 1.34 0.311** 2.72 1.37
# of Final Charges 0.175** 4.55 1.19 0.276** 9.92 1.32 0.331** 3.00 1.39
Kids -0.058 -0.85 0.94 0.067 1.34 1.07 0.158 0.75 1.17
Married 0.033 0.37 1.03 -0.079 -1.27 0.92 -0.339 -1.26 0.71
Living Together -0.137 -1.37 0.87 -0.039 -0.52 0.96 -0.383 -1.09 0.68
Divorced/Separated -0.003 -0.03 1.00 -0.252** -3.59 0.78 -0.356 -1.17 0.70
Widow 0.142 0.33 1.15 -0.212 -0.74 0.81 0.162 0.13 1.18
High School 0.068 0.85 1.07 -0.128* -2.13 0.88 0.247 1.01 1.28
GED 0.163 1.55 1.18 -0.168* -2.15 0.85 -0.076 -0.23 0.93
Some College 0.002 0.02 1.00 -0.115 -1.76 0.89 0.313 1.28 1.37
College Grad -0.127 -0.72 0.88 -0.056 -0.61 0.95 -0.068 -0.19 0.94
Other Education 0.378 1.32 1.46 0.021 0.12 1.02 -0.062 -0.09 0.94
Constant -4.807** -12.10 -- -6.164** -5.77 -- -5.681** -3.56 --
Log likelihood -3643.9248 -7714.3022 -456.62633
* p< .05, ** p<.01
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Being male appears to be a significant disadvantage within the Black and White 
groups. However, this is the only influential extralegal variable for Blacks, decreasing 
the number of Black males receiving a reduction to 73 compared to 100 Black 
females and further decreasing the ratio to 68:100 for White males to White females.  
Oppositely, being Hispanic increases charge reductions for White offenders to 121 
charge reductions per 100 for Non-Hispanic.  However, the Hispanic influence does 
not manifest in the Black and Other Race populations.  Interestingly, none of the 
illegitimate factors are influential for members of other minority races.  It appears that 
the effects of these variables are most similar between the White sample and the full 
sample, but when comparing the overall effects to the Black and other samples the 
pictures are very different. It is also interesting that while the effect of charge severity 
is consistent with the full model, criminal history is only significant (marginally) in 
the processing of Blacks.
These results give the appearance that there are many differences between the 
influences on charge reductions, both legal and extralegal, between the different race 
groups and their interactions with other variables.   However, due to the varying 
sample sizes, significance tests were conducted in order to statistically test for a 
difference between the coefficients across samples for any of the variables of interest 
that were found to differ in significance across samples.12  For the race sub-samples 
the z-tests between the Hispanic coefficients and criminal history coefficients were 
not significant. This suggests that while their influences may vary within these 
specific samples, across repeated sampling the coefficients do not differ by more than 
12
 All significance tests between samples used the conventional .05 cutoff, comparing z-tests to the 
critical value of 1.96.   All significance tests used the formula: z= (b1-b2) / [(SEb1)2 + (SEb2)2] 
(Paternoster et al., 1998)
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chance. This implies that the interactions between race and ethnicity and race and 
criminal history are not suggestive of differential processing.   
Table 5: Logistic Regression of Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic
Hispanic (n= 13,566) Non-Hispanic (n= 27,388)
Variable Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio
Age -0.002 -0.48 1.00 0.006** 2.75 1.01
Male -0.445** -5.05 0.64 -0.347** -6.32 0.72
Black -0.042 -0.27 0.96 0.032 0.65 1.03
Other Race 0.334 0.64 1.40 0.341** 3.62 1.41
Property Offense 0.275 0.89 1.32 0.582** 5.30 1.79
Drug Offense 0.301 1.05 1.35 -0.441** -4.23 0.64
Public Order Offense -0.185 -0.52 0.83 0.404** 3.14 1.50
Weapon Offense 0.269 0.85 1.31 0.544** 5.02 1.72
Immigration Offense -1.299** -3.97 0.27 -0.852** -2.69 0.43
Offense Severity 0.124** 5.09 1.13 0.246** 17.56 1.28
Criminal History -0.014 -0.57 0.99 -0.025 -1.81 0.98
Sole Defendant 0.738** 10.40 2.09 -0.053 -1.14 0.95
# of Filing Charges 0.236** 5.13 1.27 0.343** 12.54 1.41
# of Final Charges 0.322** 7.67 1.38 0.228** 8.79 1.26
Kids 0.018 0.23 1.02 0.031 0.67 1.03
Married -0.109 -1.23 0.90 0.012 0.20 1.01
Living Together -0.042 -0.43 0.96 -0.092 -1.25 0.91
Divorced/Separated -0.271* -2.40 0.76 -0.137* -2.08 0.87
Widow -0.008 -0.02 0.99 -0.078 -0.30 0.93
High School -0.184* -2.07 0.83 0.014 0.26 1.01
GED -0.182 -1.36 0.83 0.000 0.01 1.00
Some College -0.056 -0.55 0.95 -0.040 -0.67 0.96
College Grad -0.030 -0.16 0.97 -0.092 -1.04 0.91
Other Education 0.128 0.45 1.14 0.086 0.50 1.09
Constant -22.342** -17.34 -- -5.085** -16.06 --
Log likelihood -3678.0215 -8163.0931
* p< .05, ** p<.01
Table 5 above compares the Hispanic sample to the non-Hispanic. Again, being male 
consistently decreases the likelihood of a reduction for both samples with the ratio for 
males to females being 64:100 for Hispanics and 72:100 for non-Hispanics.  For non-
Hispanics, belonging to the other race group is advantageous for receiving charge 
reductions with an additional 41 charge reductions being awarded compared to 
Whites receiving reductions, however, statistical tests did not reveal significant 
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differences between this group and their counterparts in the Hispanic sample.   While 
the effect of offense severity is influential in both samples and consistent with the full 
model, the effect of criminal history is not influential in either sample.  Because this 
is opposite the impact of criminal history in the full model, it may be concluded that 
the interaction between criminal history and ethnicity is not influential.  One striking 
difference between the Hispanic sample and the non-Hispanic sample is the influence 
of sole defendant cases.  Significance tests reveal that this difference is very large, 
with Hispanic sole defendants having a much larger likelihood of receiving a 
reduction than Hispanics involved in multiple defendant cases, but the impact of a 
sole defendant in the non-Hispanic sample in not significant.  Perhaps this highlights 
a higher rate of group offending within the Hispanic population than non-Hispanics. 
Table 6 compares the treatment of males and females with regards to charge 
reductions and suggests very different influences.
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Table 6: Logistic Regression of Males vs. Females
Male (n= 35,031) Female (n= 5,954)
Variable Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio
Age 0.006** 3.04 1.01 -0.004 -0.88 1.00
Black 0.014 0.28 1.01 -0.034 -0.31 0.97
Other Race 0.404** 3.99 1.50 0.274 1.29 1.31
Hispanic 0.223** 4.04 1.25 0.062 0.51 1.06
Property Offense 0.744** 6.69 2.10 -0.445 -1.56 0.64
Drug Offense -0.189 -1.83 0.83 -0.704* -2.43 0.49
Public Order Offense 0.445** 3.43 1.56 -0.433 -1.31 0.65
Weapon Offense 0.604** 5.59 1.83 -0.287 -0.77 0.75
Immigration Offense -0.809** -4.92 0.45 -1.960** -3.88 0.14
Offense Severity 0.214** 15.96 1.24 0.261** 8.41 1.30
Criminal History -0.015 -1.16 0.99 -0.134** -3.12 0.87
Sole Defendant 0.175** 4.13 1.19 0.408** 4.29 1.50
# of Filing Charges 0.347** 13.52 1.42 0.239** 4.12 1.27
# of Final Charges 0.216** 8.92 1.24 0.367** 6.79 1.44
Kids -0.001 -0.03 1.00 0.080 0.88 1.08
Married -0.029 -0.54 0.97 -0.036 -0.30 0.97
Living Together -0.028 -0.45 0.97 -0.255 -1.72 0.77
Divorced/Separated -0.190** -2.94 0.83 -0.162 -1.34 0.85
Widow -0.124 -0.36 0.88 0.014 0.04 1.01
High School -0.076 -1.47 0.93 0.040 0.35 1.04
GED -0.011 -0.16 0.99 -0.391* -2.45 0.68
Some College -0.070 -1.22 0.93 -0.056 -0.48 0.95
College Grad -0.108 -1.27 0.90 -0.164 -0.80 0.85
Other Education 0.108 0.64 1.11 0.027 0.09 1.03
Constant -5.380** -17.15 -- -6.153** -5.35 --
Log likelihood -9914.3924 -1976.6634
* p< .05, ** p<.01
While being male has consistently been a disadvantage in the previous models 
these results suggest that certain males have advantages with regard to illegitimate 
factors altering the odds of receiving a charge reduction.  Specifically, Hispanic males 
appear to receive more charge reductions than non-Hispanic males as illustrated by 
the odds ratios of 1.25, and minority males (other than Black) are also benefited when 
receiving reductions with a ratio of 150:100 compared to their white male 
counterparts. 
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In a more general picture, this model suggests that net of the legally relevant 
variables and controls, females are treated consistently within the system and other 
illegitimate factors do not vary the chances of reduction.  However, the large 
difference in sample sizes leads to differences in the amounts of statistical power to 
detect differences within the various samples.  Whereas, the results show some 
support in direction that these differences exist, z-tests revealed that the influence of 
these interactions with gender have not yet met the threshold of statistical significance 
and need more investigation, with one exception.  One very interesting finding is that 
criminal history is only influential in the treatment of females, whereas severity of 
offense mirrors the previous results for males and females.  This difference in the 
influence of criminal history on males and females is supported by statistical testing 
which confirms that the coefficients differ by significantly more than chance.  These 
results support a gender interaction with criminal history on the likelihood of 
receiving a charge reduction.
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Table 7: Logistic Regression of Age Categories
Age 17-29 (n=16,654) Age 30-49 (n= 20,323) Age 50+ (n=4,057)
Variable Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio Coefficient (z)
Odds 
Ratio
Age -0.024* -2.54 0.98 0.011* 2.40 1.01 0.020* 2.18 1.02
Male -0.495** -6.76 0.61 -0.360** -5.46 0.70 -0.008 -0.05 0.99
Black -0.092 -1.24 0.91 0.072 1.09 1.07 0.059 0.37 1.06
Other Race 0.381* 2.51 1.46 0.497** 3.97 1.64 -0.164 -0.54 0.85
Hispanic 0.277** 3.56 1.32 0.138 1.91 1.15 0.005 0.03 1.01
Property Offense 0.852** 4.92 2.34 0.426** 2.99 1.53 -0.187 -0.60 0.83
Drug Offense 0.096 0.60 1.10 -0.282* -2.07 0.75 -1.117** -3.59 0.33
Public Order Offense 0.535* 2.34 1.71 0.273 1.67 1.31 -0.325 -0.97 0.72
Weapon Offense 0.818** 4.95 2.27 0.369* 2.51 1.45 0.116 0.34 1.12
Immigration Offense -0.997** -3.68 0.37 -0.883** -4.25 0.41 -0.701 -1.38 0.50
Offense Severity 0.233** 11.79 1.26 0.196** 11.26 1.22 0.293** 7.89 1.34
Criminal History -0.003 -0.16 1.00 -0.022 -1.31 0.98 -0.090 -1.87 0.91
Sole Defendant 0.259** 4.39 1.30 0.234** 4.15 1.26 -0.101 -0.80 0.90
# of Filing Charges 0.375** 9.45 1.46 0.319** 9.81 1.38 0.236** 3.53 1.27
# of Final Charges 0.156** 4.19 1.17 0.270** 8.82 1.31 0.420** 6.68 1.52
Kids -0.011 -0.17 0.99 0.114 1.89 1.12 0.091 0.73 1.10
Married -0.047 -0.59 0.95 -0.005 -0.07 1.00 0.009 0.05 1.01
Living Together -0.051 -0.62 0.95 -0.065 -0.73 0.94 -0.048 -0.18 0.95
Divorced/Separated -0.090 -0.77 0.91 -0.202** -2.66 0.82 -0.052 -0.25 0.95
Widow 0.866 0.98 2.38 -0.125 -0.37 0.88 0.115 0.29 1.21
High School 0.015 0.21 1.01 -0.085 -1.24 0.92 -0.126 -0.77 0.88
GED -0.050 -0.55 0.95 -0.033 -0.38 0.97 -0.239 -0.97 0.79
Some College 0.045 0.55 1.05 -0.136 -1.86 0.87 -0.171 -0.99 0.84
College Grad -0.243 -1.02 0.78 -0.133 -1.27 0.88 -0.023 -0.13 0.98
Other Education 0.253 0.95 1.29 -0.026 -0.13 0.97 0.212 0.49 1.24
Constant -4.886** -9.27 -- -5.052** -11.61 -- -7.037** -5.10 --
Log likelihood -4932.4435 -5726.9285 -1166.6399
* p< .05, ** p<.01
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The final comparison is among different age groups and the results are shown 
above in Table 7.  A few interesting findings emerge from this analysis.  Overall it 
appears that fewer factors are important in determining charge reduction as an 
individual gets older. Significance tests across the models show some support for this 
conclusion.  While these tests do not reveal significant differences between the 
coefficients in the age 19-29 and age 30-49 models, they do support the conclusion 
that the influence of male and other race diminishes once the age of 50 is reached 
when compared to the two younger models.  Research by Steffensmeier et al. (1995; 
1998) finds support for a curvilinear effect of age, which supports that individuals 
over the age of 50 are treated the most leniently, supporting the advantage of this age 
group for receiving charge reductions.  However, Steffensmeier et al. (1995; 1998) 
also suggest that extremely young offenders (18-21) may be treated less severely than 
those aged 21-29.  Therefore, combining these two age groups as was done in the 
above results may contribute to lack of differences between the two younger models.  
Future research may want to break these age groups down into smaller ranges to see 
if additional differences emerge.
That being acknowledged, the above models suggest that defendants ages 17-
29 and 30-49 are treated relatively similarly with male being a disadvantage (with 
odds ratios of 61 and .70 respectively) and other minority races as an advantage 
(increasing the ratio of charge reductions to 146:100 and 164:100 respectively 
compared to their white counterparts).  However, the magnitude of the coefficients 
lessen with age for male, suggesting that its importance decreases with age.  An 
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additional advantage for the youngest age group appear to be being Hispanic, when 
compared to the two older age models, but these differences between the models do 
not hold true when statistically comparing the coefficients.  The impact of criminal 
history is consistently not influential, but the influence of offense severity remains the 
same as all previous models.  
These results reveal some interesting findings and provide many areas of 
exploration for future research.  Whereas the differences in the significance of the key 
independent variables between the different samples is considerable, the statistical 
tests across the models do not always meet the threshold of significance.  However, 
there is some evidence of differential processing, both among the main effects in the 
full model, and some of the interaction effects.  Although being male is consistently a 
disadvantage,  there also appears to be an interaction with age suggesting that gender 
is no longer influential among older defendants (age 50 and above).   The variables on 
race and ethnicity vary on significance in many of the models.  The results of the full 
model do suggest that minorities other than blacks are treated more leniently 
compared to whites, and Hispanics are slightly advantaged.  These results support the 
hypothesis that extralegal factors are influencing prosecutorial charging decisions.  
Additionally, the hypothesis of differential influence is also supported by the 
differences across the age models in which other race is no longer influential among 
older defendants.  Finally, there is also support for differential use of legal factors, 
specifically, criminal history, with its influence manifesting in the processing of 
females, but not males.  
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These comparisons between the sub-sample results and contrasts with the full 
model illustrate some differences, suggesting that some effects are masked when all 
individuals are combined into one sample.  However, some may feel that the 
magnitude of these results as reflected in the odds ratios, is not overwhelming.   It is 
possible that some differences are still being overlooked due to the binary nature of 
the dependent variable.  Perhaps the probability of receiving a charge reduction, net 
of the control variables, does not vary much based on these variables and sub-
samples, but the differential processing may lie in the magnitude of the reduction.  
For example, whereas the difference between getting a reduction for Hispanics and 
non-Hispanics may not be that substantial (a ratio of 119:100), if Hispanics are 
consistently getting much larger reductions than non-Hispanics, this would not be 
captured in the dependent variable above.  Therefore, it is necessary to look at the 
influence of these variables on the magnitude of the charge change to account for the 
possibility of these differences. 
OLS Regression Results
The next question addressed looks at the independent variables more closely and 
tells us how influential they are in the magnitude of the difference between the 
maximum penalty possible for filing charges versus final charges.  For the most part 
these results concur with those of the logistic regression when looking at the direction 
of influence.  However, some of the variables significantly contribute to the binary 
outcome of getting a charge reduction but do not significantly predict the magnitude 
of change.  Table 8 shows the results for the full model which uses the entire sample.
57
Table 8: OLS Regression: Full Model
Variable Coefficient (t)
Age -0.003 -0.55
Male 0.922** 6.17
Black 0.039 0.28
Other Race -0.591* -1.97
Hispanic -0.615** -3.95
Prisoner Offense 3.144 1.14
Property Offense -0.861** -2.96
Drug Offense -0.712* -2.55
Public Order Offense -1.093** -3.25
Weapon Offense -0.813** -2.67
Immigration Offense -1.574** -4.63
Offense Severity -0.690** -21.71
Criminal History 0.069* 1.99
Sole Defendant -0.782** -6.38
# of Filing Charges -1.731** -20.58
# of Final Charges 0.142 1.89
Kids -0.129 -1.10
Married 0.184 1.26
Living Together 0.009 0.05
Divorced/Separated 0.420* 2.54
Widow -0.660 -0.96
High School 0.090 0.63
GED 0.168 0.92
Some College -0.012 -0.08
College Grad 0.051 0.22
Other Education -0.134 -0.28
Constant 6.475** 6.93
* p< .05, ** p<.01 R-squared=.09
These results mimic those of the full logistic model with the exception of age.  
While being male leads to a higher potential sentence than female (a disadvantage of 
about 11 additional months), being in the other race category and Hispanic both 
significantly decrease the maximum potential sentence between filing and pleading 
compared to Whites and non-Hispanics by about 7 months each, which is indicative 
of a charge reduction.  Similar to the logistic regression results, all of the legal 
variables are influential in the average processing of defendants (and in the same 
direction as explained in the previous section).  One of the most striking results is the 
R-squared value of .09.  This suggests that the model is only explaining 9% of the 
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variance in the charge reduction outcome.  While this value is comparable to those in 
other charge reduction research (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987) it should 
be further investigated.
Again, observing these differences within the context of sub-samples to see if 
something is lost by looking at the entirety of the sample may be beneficial.  Because 
the logistic regression results supported some differential treatment it will be 
interesting to see not just what factors affect the magnitude of the charge change, but 
if certain groups are consistently getting larger reductions, or if the same factors are 
contributing to the magnitude of the change between each group. After all, the full 
model shows us an average effect, but it is plausible to believe that some groups 
could be getting very large reductions and others minimal reductions, which gives the 
appearance of a moderate effect.  Uncovering these differences gives a more accurate 
depiction of how the system is operating, and the following results attempt to do just 
that.  Tables 9-12 below show the results of these analyses, but only the results that 
do not concur with the previous results in the logistic regression will be discussed.  
59
Table 9: OLS Regression of Race Sub-samples
Black (n= 12,314) White (n= 27,386) Other Race (n=1,559)
Variable Coefficient (t) Coefficient (t) Coefficient (t)
Age 0.008 0.59 -0.005 -0.79 -0.017 -0.65
Male 0.770* 2.42 1.029** 5.98 0.021 0.03
Hispanic 0.241 0.42 -0.687** -4.27 -0.422 -0.30
Prisoner Offense 4.218 0.71 2.998 0.89 7.397 1.08
Property Offense -2.107** -3.60 -0.384 -1.06 -0.885 -0.98
Drug Offense -1.764** -3.21 -0.463 -1.31 1.745 1.89
Public Order Offense -2.092** -2.70 -0.655 -1.63 -1.811 -1.64
Weapon Offense -2.169** -3.76 -0.258 -0.66 0.311 0.26
Immigration Offense -3.377** -3.43 -0.843* -2.09 -1.046 -0.78
Offense Severity -0.674** -10.14 -0.663** -17.95 -1.134** -8.67
Criminal History 0.105 1.55 0.024 0.59 -0.001 -0.01
Sole Defendant -0.326 -1.29 -0.990** -6.99 -0.390 -0.62
# of Filing Charges -2.359** -14.09 -1.366** -13.79 -1.794** -4.64
# of Final Charges 0.550** 3.68 -0.101 -1.14 0.178 0.51
Kids -0.174 -0.73 -0.214 -1.57 0.620 1.04
Married 0.005 0.02 0.230 1.36 0.725 0.96
Living Together 0.279 0.82 -0.145 -0.71 0.694 0.71
Divorced/Separated -0.175 -0.48 0.600** 3.20 0.756 0.88
Widow -1.257 -0.78 -0.595 -0.79 1.260 0.38
High School -0.344 -1.20 0.333* 2.00 -0.036 -0.05
GED -0.386 -1.06 0.359 1.68 1.573 1.63
Some College -0.280 -0.89 0.190 1.04 -0.407 -0.57
College Grad 0.088 0.15 0.014 0.06 0.705 0.74
Other Education -0.145 -0.13 -0.149 -0.28 -0.642 -0.32
Constant 7.354** 5.30 6.556** 3.21 8.232 1.43
* p< .05, ** p<.01       R-squared=.09   R-squared=.10    R-squared=.17
There are no substantive differences between the logistic results and OLS results 
when comparing the racial sub-samples.  What is remarkable is the difference in the 
magnitude of the effect of male between Blacks and Whites.  Being male for a black 
individual increases the potential sentence by about 9 months compared to females, 
but for white individuals the difference is a little more than a year.  While these 
results appear substantively significant, the difference between these coefficients does 
not reach statistical significance.  However, it is again consistent that the White 
sample most closely resembles the results of the full model and the Black and other 
race groups have much less statistically significant influences.  One difference that 
stands out among these samples is the negative and significant coefficients of the 
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offense types within the black model compared to the white and other race models.  
Significance tests confirmed the differences across these models and suggest that 
violent offenses may be more salient among black defendants and that they 
overwhelmingly receive smaller reductions when being charged with a violent crime.  
Again, the criminal history results are consistent across races but are opposite the 
overall effect found in the full OLS model.
Table 10: OLS Regression of Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic
Hispanic (n= 13,851) Non-Hispanic (n= 27,408)
Variable Coefficient (t) Coefficient (t)
Age 0.007 0.75 -0.004 -0.59
Male 1.739** 6.19 0.664** 3.73
Black 0.216 0.50 -0.125 -0.81
Other Race -1.080 -0.80 -0.584 -1.81
Prisoner Offense 2.289 0.24 3.131 1.06
Property Offense -0.187 -0.21 -1.038** -3.27
Drug Offense -1.829* -2.18 -0.328 -1.07
Public Order Offense -0.135 -0.14 -1.298** -3.50
Weapon Offense -0.683 -0.73 -0.901** -2.72
Immigration Offense -1.590 -1.79 -1.130* -2.05
Offense Severity -0.614** -9.78 -0.717** -19.13
Criminal History -0.008 -0.14 0.095* 2.21
Sole Defendant -1.809** -8.83 -0.318* -2.08
# of Filing Charges -1.474** -9.63 -1.790** -17.64
# of Final Charges -0.189 -1.40 0.248** 2.71
Kids -0.164 -0.80 -0.155 -1.08
Married 0.285 1.21 0.095 0.51
Living Together 0.088 0.33 -0.043 -0.19
Divorced/Separated 0.850** 2.88 0.223 1.11
Widow -0.102 -0.08 -0.867 -1.07
High School 0.397 1.63 -0.090 -0.50
GED 0.176 0.49 0.119 0.55
Some College 0.129 0.43 -0.111 -0.59
College Grad 0.401 0.71 -0.007 -0.03
Other Education 0.254 0.27 -0.268 -0.47
Constant 8.282** 3.11 6.289** 6.09
* p< .05, ** p<.01           R-squared=.14                      R-squared=.08
For the Hispanic vs. non-Hispanic comparison only male is influential within 
both groups.  While the results are the same in the logistic regression for Hispanics, 
this differs from the logistic regression results of non-Hispanics where other race was 
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also advantageous.  However, the magnitude of the influence varies between these 
groups. Where Hispanic males receive almost a year and nine months more than 
Hispanic females, the disadvantage of being male for non-Hispanic only translates to 
an additional 8 months over females, which is both a statistical and substantive 
difference.  
Table 11: OLS Regression of Males vs. Females
Male (n= 35,048) Female (n= 6,211)
Variable Coefficient (t) Coefficient (t)
Age -0.007 -1.11 0.018 1.53
Black -0.047 -0.30 0.112 0.39
Other Race -0.760* -2.21 -0.164 -0.29
Hispanic -0.639** -3.68 -0.533 -1.53
Prisoner Offense 3.126 1.07 4.041 0.46
Property Offense -1.083** -3.43 -0.851 -1.01
Drug Offense -0.564 -1.89 -2.093* -2.44
Public Order Offense -1.210** -3.31 -1.029 -1.10
Weapon Offense -0.762* -2.37 -2.074 -1.87
Immigration Offense -1.720** -4.68 -0.110 -0.11
Offense Severity -0.683** -19.14 -0.746** -11.21
Criminal History 0.049 1.30 0.306** 2.97
Sole Defendant -0.679** -4.95 -1.145** -4.42
# of Filing Charges -1.890** -20.26 -0.703** -3.75
# of Final Charges 0.284** 3.40 -0.709** -4.21
Kids -0.056 -0.42 -0.276 -1.14
Married 0.093 0.57 0.349 1.10
Living Together -0.168 -0.88 0.839* 2.09
Divorced/Separated 0.349 1.85 0.764* 2.36
Widow -1.393 -1.37 -0.010 -0.01
High School 0.134 0.84 -0.252 -0.80
GED 0.074 0.37 0.868* 2.08
Some College 0.004 0.02 -0.116 -0.37
College Grad 0.019 0.07 0.420 0.80
Other Education -0.320 -0.56 0.337 0.40
Constant 7.125** 6.88 7.929** 3.94
* p< .05, ** p<.01          R-squared=.09               R-squared=.18
The results for males and females are almost identical to their counterpart 
logistic regressions.  It is also notable that the results for males are very similar to 
those of the original model, however the influences for females do not look anything 
like the full model. Whereas some of the extralegal factors are influential in the OLS 
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model (other race and Hispanic) looking at just females reveals no significant 
influence by illegitimate factors, which suggests that the effect of these variables on 
males is what is driving the overall effects.  However, these differences should be 
further investigated because the differences between the samples do not reach the 
threshold of statistical significance.  Another striking difference is the magnitude of 
the effect of the number of filing charges.  Whereas an increase in the number of 
filing charges results in a reduction in the potential sentence 23 months for males, it 
only translates to an 8 month reduction for females, a difference that is statistically 
significant.  Perhaps this is indicative of overcharging by prosecutors for men, leading 
to greater reductions in order to compensate and provide a more realistic sentences 
after the initial charging stage, especially since increases in  the number of final 
charges is still a disadvantage for males, but advantageous for females.
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Table 12: OLS Regression of Age Categories
Age 17-29 (n= 16,745) Age 30-49 (n= 20,338) Age 50+ (n=4,176)
Variable Coefficient (t) Coefficient (t) Coefficient (t)
Age 0.076* 2.42 -0.027* -2.02 -0.045* -2.07
Male 1.564** 5.92 0.665** 3.29 -0.045 -0.12
Black -0.102 -0.42 -0.049 -0.26 0.344 0.96
Other Race -1.052* -1.97 -0.464 -1.13 -0.165 -0.25
Hispanic -1.281** -4.74 -0.129 -0.61 -0.514 -1.26
Prisoner Offense 1.871 0.29 2.926 0.93 6.615 0.82
Property Offense -1.705** -3.35 -0.503 -1.28 0.693 0.94
Drug Offense -1.739** -3.67 -0.328 -0.86 1.741* 2.32
Public Order Offense -2.331** -3.52 -0.590 -1.31 0.530 0.68
Weapon Offense -1.870** -3.68 -0.018 -0.04 0.694 0.82
Immigration Offense -2.445** -4.18 -1.314** -2.85 0.006 0.01
Offense Severity -0.693** -12.81 -0.674** -15.26 -0.871** -11.24
Criminal History -0.065 -1.03 0.100* 2.16 0.117 1.15
Sole Defendant -1.003** -4.93 -0.882** -5.11 0.536 1.74
# of Filing Charges -2.287** -15.04 -1.546** -13.62 -0.683** -3.68
# of Final Charges 0.341* 2.47 0.104 1.03 -0.365* -2.23
Kids 0.118 0.58 -0.568** -3.35 0.017 0.06
Married -0.287 -1.11 0.370 1.86 0.229 0.53
Living Together 0.112 0.42 -0.074 -0.29 -0.674 -1.09
Divorced/Separated 0.132 0.35 0.555** 2.62 0.194 0.44
Widow -0.118 -0.03 -1.049 -1.12 -0.259 -0.30
High School -0.001 0.00 0.153 0.77 0.042 0.11
GED -0.117 -0.39 0.377 1.49 0.448 0.85
Some College -0.447 -1.62 0.148 0.69 0.392 1.01
College Grad 0.021 0.03 0.173 0.57 0.087 0.22
Other Education -0.257 -0.26 0.292 0.47 -2.173* -2.11
Constant 5.623** 3.27 7.538** 5.56 6.274* 2.39
* p< .05, ** p<.01       R-squared=.10       R-squared=.09     R-squared=.14
The OLS results for the age categories are similar to those of the logistic 
regression with the exception of the other race and Hispanic variables that were 
significant for determining the likelihood of a reduction but do not appear to matter in 
the magnitude of the change for individuals aged 30-49.  What is interesting is how 
strong the influences are of all of the significant variables among the age 17-29 
group, where being male translates into a year and a half increase in potential 
punishment compared to their female counterparts and being in the other race 
category and Hispanic are the equivalent of a little over a year less than Whites and 
non-Hispanics.  Whereas significance tests found no differences across the models 
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with respect to the other race variable, influence of Hispanic does reach statistical 
significance, supporting the idea that it is influential in the processing of defendants 
ages 17-29 but not 30-49.  The magnitude of the male effect is statistically significant 
across all three age categories, suggesting a significant interaction between age and 
gender.  
Also noteworthy is the effect of age.  Although in the full OLS model the age 
variable was not significant this could be due to the directional differences among the 
different age groups, which may be supportive of the curvilinear effect of age 
discussed in the logistic results.  In the 17-29 age group, increasing in age each year 
translates into about an additional month per year whereas in the 30-49 and 50+ 
categories increasing in age each year returns only minute decreases in potential 
sentences.  Statistical tests reveal that the influence of age within the age 17-29 
category is significantly larger than the other two age groups.  Whereas the magnitude 
of these changes may appear inconsequential, the potential increase in punishment 
between the ages of 17-29 can add up to be substantially more than their counterparts 
in the other age categories.  Again, it appears that the older a defendant is the less 
important factors other than age become in influencing their possible punishment.
Lastly, while the influence of the legally relevant variable of offense severity is 
consistent throughout these models and with the logistic regression models, the 
criminal history variable is very inconsistent.  This variable is only a disadvantage in 
the processing of females and individuals age 30-49.
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions
The above results indicate support for both of the research hypotheses.  Prosecutors 
are allowing illegitimate factors to influence their decisions to offer charge 
reductions, the size of the reductions, and, more importantly there is some evidence 
that they are using these decisions differentially across different groups of individuals 
and in varying magnitudes.  There are a few main findings that emerged from this 
research that are worth mentioning, some of which concur with prior research and 
some of which do not.  The most consistent result from these analyses reveals that 
being male is a disadvantage for receiving a charge reduction and for the amount of 
the reduction, both in the general models and across most of the sub-samples.  This 
finding is contrary to the majority of charge reduction research which has found no 
main effect for gender. A surprising result that emerged was that models in which 
Hispanic was influential it was actually beneficial in the charge reductions.  Although 
this finding may be unanticipated, it is not unfounded within the literature.  Within 
the charging and sentencing realms the conclusions on being Hispanic are varied, 
with many studies finding no significance (Bernstein et al., 1977 Holmes et al., 1987; 
chart in Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001) and when significance was found the 
magnitude of the effect was small (see chart in Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001).  
One of the reasons for this inconsistency could be the way in which Hispanic is being 
used in regression models.  This is the first study within the charging literature that 
separated Hispanic out as an ethnicity variable and did not combine it with the other 
races.  This was because there were members of each race category that were also 
identified as Hispanic.  Therefore, this study can be viewed as the first to look at the 
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effect of being Hispanic independent of one’s race.  Perhaps this result ensued 
because the Hispanic variable is confounded by the race variable and perhaps the 
advantage is actually tied to being White.
It is noteworthy to mention that one of the most consistent findings was that 
charge severity matters significantly in all of the models and stands out as one of the 
most influential factors.  This is promising in a broader sense because it supports that 
legal factors are the most influential in decision making.  What may be surprising is 
the direction of the effect, with the likelihood of charge reductions increasing as 
offense severity increases.  However, I suggest that this could be due to the fact that 
the more serious the original charge the more room there is for movement, whereas 
being originally charged with a crime that has a maximum of one year leaves many 
fewer crimes to be pled down to.  The departure literature points to another possible 
explanation in which the prosecutors could offer large reductions for more severe 
offenses in order to avoid overly punitive punishments (Kramer & Ulmer, 2002).  On 
the other hand, whereas the legal factor of criminal history was significant in the 
overall models its significance was very inconsistent across sub-samples, which 
should probably be further investigated.  
Anyone can look at the previous results section and uncover what the numbers 
mean for these specific statistical models, but what is more important is what they 
mean in the grand scheme of things.  Why is this research important and how does it 
influence future research and policy?  These areas are where I believe the strength of 
this research lies.  After looking at the magnitude of the effects found, one may begin 
to question the substantive importance of this research.  Additionally, since the 
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magnitudes do not differ much from the other research in this area, the question could 
be asked if this area of research is important to investigate.  I believe that the answer 
is yes, mainly because while this research has highlighted many problems and voids 
in this charging research, it has also showed support for the hypotheses and suggests 
direction for future research.  
First of all, it seems from comparisons between this research and the previous 
literature that using a continuous dependent variable representing the magnitude of 
change is most beneficial.  When comparing the logistic results to the OLS results 
this point becomes much clearer.  There is not much difference in the significance 
and/or direction of the effects between the two types of analyses.  However, the OLS 
results present a more substantive difference.   Whereas the dichotomized dependent 
variable shows some variation between sub-samples, the OLS results show greater 
differences and allow more tangible differences to be uncovered by looking at the 
specific size of the effects.  For example, whereas about 119 Hispanics receive charge 
reductions per 100 non-Hispanic reductions, on average the reductions of Hispanics 
are also 7 months more than the reductions of non-Hispanics.  The benefit of the 
continuous dependent variable is also seen in the many more significant interactions 
that emerge in the OLS results compared to the logistic results.  Using a continuous 
dependent variable allows differential processing to be captured through magnitude 
even when similarly situated individuals are being treated the same in direction.  
The illumination of differential processing is a major accomplishment from 
this research.  Although the specific differences of individual variables between sub-
samples has already been discussed, there is another way to highlight this problem 
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that may be more telling.  Despite the fact that the same model was used in each 
analysis, there is a wide range of R-squared values between sub-samples.  This 
suggests that different factors are predicting the behavior of prosecutors towards 
different individuals.  For example, the variables that only predict 9% of the variance 
for males predict twice that (18%) for females. Additionally, it appears that these 
models are predicting less of the variance for the groups that are stereotypically 
thought to be disadvantaged (i.e. males and blacks) suggesting that we may not be 
capturing the variables in which the stereotypes are manifesting.  Therefore, not only 
are these variables predicting outcomes in very inconsistent patterns, they show that 
we know much less about certain groups which points to huge need for more 
research.
In the larger picture, the R-square values in charge reduction research, 
including the current analysis, is very telling about the direction of future research.  
Overall, charge reduction research is explaining very little variance in the dependent 
variable (ranging from .09 to .24) (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987).  In the 
current research, some of this is presumed to be due to the lack of evidence variables.  
However, even research that does include some evidence controls is still not 
producing large R-squares (Holmes et al., 1987).  Therefore, perhaps charge 
reduction research efforts need concentrate on developing better models to uncover 
what is driving these decisions.  When compared to sentencing models using many of 
the same models the R-square values appear lower in the charging literature 
(Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Albonetti, 1997), 
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suggesting that different factors are influential at the charging stage of case 
processing.  
In addition to finding better models, this research did highlight some other 
avenues for future research.  Although jurisdictional differences were not a focus in 
this research, the models suggest that it should be.  There was a lot of variation in the 
significance of the district variables and the magnitude of the coefficients.  This 
suggests that decision making processes may vary greatly by jurisdiction, which 
should not be the case within the Federal system, and also may help explain the 
inconsistent conclusions among charging literature since most have been district 
specific.  Most importantly, future research should seek to substantiate these findings.  
As previously mentioned, charging research within the Federal system, using all 
offenses and jurisdictions, and separating race and ethnicity has not been done prior 
to the current project.  Therefore, before any of the results can be used for policy 
changes the results must be replicated.  Additionally, it is no secret that the ultimate 
interest in charging research is how it is going to affect the ultimate sentence of an 
individual.  While this research highlights the amount of change a prosecutor is 
willing to allow, future research should use the benefits of this data and continue to 
follow these cases through sentencing to see how these charging decisions ultimately 
play out.  Finally, this research helps to highlight some possible interactions that may 
be worth investigating.  Specifically, interactions between criminal history and 
gender, gender and age, ethnicity and age, ethnicity and race, and criminal history and 
age appear to have some merit based on the above results.  Investigating these 
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influences with interaction regression modeling can add to another void in the 
literature.
Theoretically, this research lends credence to attribution theory and the focal 
concerns perspective.  Although each of the avenues of potential differential 
processing were not found to be significant, there is still substantial support.  
Specifically, the full sample models show that some race, ethnicity, and gender 
effects are influential in the decision making process.  In addition, some of the 
interactions suggest that the use of both the extralegal variables and legal variables 
vary by sub-group, and even when their use is consistent across samples, the 
magnitude of the influence fluctuates.  These results are supportive of the theories 
because some of the influential factors are those that are not permitted for use in 
decision making processes, but clearly are being used.  In addition, some of the 
effects are found to support stereotypes, specifically young, males receiving less 
charge reductions.  However, it should be noted that other stereotypes, specifically 
regarding blacks, are not supported.  Findings supportive of stereotypes confirm the 
literature on the causal attribution process, but some of the results appear to point 
toward some focal concerns outside of offender blameworthiness, which support the 
development of attribution theory into the focal concerns perspective.  Specifically, 
some defendant characteristics are likely to speak to perceptions of the offenders’ 
likelihood of surviving in prison (i.e. gender), which may be directly linked to charge 
reductions in this research that specifically lower the potential maximum sentences. 
 It is also worth noting that there was very little consistent significant effects 
among the other control variables (namely education, marital status, etc.).  This 
71
suggests that the causal attributions most often cited in these theories (gender, race, 
and age), and which are consistently found to be influential in the research, are likely 
to be those operating in decision making most often.  Lastly, some of the interaction 
effects supported in this research, specifically those between criminal history and the 
extralegal variables, in conjunction with the departure literature addressed, show 
some support for a focal concern of prosecutors that may not influence other 
courtroom actors.   These interactions could be indicative of prosecutors trying to 
adjust sentences that they believe would be overly punitive if reductions were not 
awarded.  Having additional variables measuring that would show the lack of 
knowledge available to the prosecutor (such as strength of evidence), which would 
further contribute to reliance on these attributions, would be more beneficial in testing 
these theoretical ideas, but they seem to have merit.
It appears by comparing the results of this research to the results of previous 
literature that extralegal factors are operating within the system and that their 
influences are expanding beyond the decision making of judges.  Therefore, it seems 
plausible that the theoretical justifications of judges’ decision making through 
attribution theory and focal concerns can also be expanded to prosecutorial decisions.  
This theoretical expansion will be beneficial in helping to understand the processes 
operating early on in case processing and the influence of these decisions on later 
processing.  Finding support for theories are applicable across stages of case 
processing is beneficial to the field, and the current research has contributed to this 
expansion.  
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Just like all research, the current research has some limitations.  The biggest 
problem is the potential for omitted variable bias.  As already noted there is a lack of 
evidence variables, which one would like to believe would be very influential in the 
plea bargaining/charge reduction process.  Also, this data lacked employment 
variables which have been used in some of the other charge reduction literature as 
controls.  Finally, as previously discussed, this research intended to use a control for 
the type of legal counsel, but was unable.  
Although the conclusions of this research are not yet corroborated to make
drastic changes to the current system, they do suggest policy implications.  The public 
wants prosecutors to be held accountable for their decisions.  This research helps to 
do that and does support the public suspicion that defendant characteristics may 
influence prosecutorial decision making, although not always in the expected 
direction.  However, this research also shows that the legal factors in a case are the 
most influential and that perhaps the abuse of discretion is not as severe as some 
think. This is not to say that the conclusions regarding differential processing and the 
use of illegitimate factors should not result in policy change.  These findings suggest 
that prosecutors are clearly going against the current policies which specifically state
which factors can and cannot be used in charging and plea bargaining decisions. 
Equally as important is the need for policies that prevent differential processing and 
allow similarly situated defendants on legal factors to be similarly treated. Therefore,
more scrutiny and overseeing of prosecutorial charging decisions is necessary.  
Whereas the magnitude of these results may not affect the legitimacy of the system 
from the public perspective as much as originally anticipated, from an offender’s 
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point of view these results can significantly impact perceptions of legitimacy.  This is 
especially true because these findings show offenders that some of the processing 
decisions made in their cases are based on their appearances and the stereotypes that 
the system allows to prevail.  Therefore, policies are needed to curb this problem.
The current research paints a general picture of how extralegal factors are 
being used within the Federal system.  It suggests that illegitimate factors are 
influential in the charging decisions of prosecutors and, more disturbingly, are being 
used differentially among certain groups of individuals.  While some may question 
the substantive importance of the magnitude of these findings I am sure any offender 
that was asked whether they would rather spend 8 months in jail versus a year and 
nine months the response would be the former.  And unfortunately, in some instances 
this difference is influenced by defendant characteristics as opposed to legal case 
characteristics.  As telling as this research has been in uncovering the current 
injustices within the system, it also uncovered weaknesses in charging research in 
general and highlights areas for improvement and the need for future research.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Results for District Variables
Logistic Regression: Full Model
District Coefficient z
Maine -.822882 -1.75
Mass -.6856757 -1.99
Newhamp -1.058996 -2.00
Rhodeisl -2.301736 -2.19
P_rico -.6830494 -2.13
Conn -.1964606 -0.55
ny_n -1.917414 -3.93
ny_e .8648851 3.32
ny_s -.4169548 -1.53
ny_w .1905853 0.64
vermont .3675414 1.01
del .1211593 0.27
jersey -.5513037 -1.76
penn_e -1.000291 -3.36
penn_m .2613651 0.87
penn_w -.4055324 -1.17
maryland -.3759838 -1.25
ncar_e -.6792377 -2.17
ncar_m -.3156732 -1.02
ncar_w -.4888906 -1.61
scar .2471721 0.90
virg_e -.7044995 -2.59
virg_w -.5931588 -1.84
wvirg_n -.5736351 -1.56
wvirg_s .0200785 0.07
alab_n -1.472241 -3.59
alab_m -.2475494 -0.65
alab_s .6554987 2.19
flor_n -1.067044 -2.74
flor_m -.5567078 -2.01
flor_s .5144023 2.00
georg_n -.0261632 -0.09
georg_m -.0522192 -0.17
georg_s -.3822988 -1.11
louis_e -.1267731 -0.41
louis_w .068406 0.21
miss_n -.6836212 -1.61
miss_s -.0785009 -0.26
texas_n .1310295 0.49
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District Coefficient z
texas_e .2537788 0.90
texas_s -.113589 -0.44
texas_w .6569666 2.57
kent_e -.9646599 -3.15
kent_w -1.555495 -3.48
mich_e -.1158261 -0.41
mich_w .340455 1.10
ohio_n -.1396467 -0.51
ohio_s -.335709 -1.03
tenn_e -.6497232 -2.15
tenn_m -.6565701 -1.89
tenn_w .1086938 0.35
illin_n .4209794 1.53
illin_c -1.220046 -3.08
illin_s -2.903407 -3.85
indi_n -.3715592 -1.10
indi_s -.8043543 -1.80
wisc_e .2729579 0.87
wisc_w -.5853533 -1.30
ark_e .4571894 1.43
ark_w -1.03116 -1.79
iowa_n -.6053897 -1.70
iowa_s -1.29802 -3.43
minn .5178675 1.76
misso_e -.4738798 -1.53
misso_w -.2875344 -1.00
nebraska -.8725427 -2.69
ndakota .0848292 0.22
sdakota .7780531 2.49
arizona -.2127826 -0.79
cali_n .8233541 2.97
cali_e .761109 2.69
cali_c -.1827483 -0.68
cali_s .1773394 0.64
hawaii -.4120495 -1.27
idaho .0823394 0.19
montana .0834239 0.25
nevada -.5745518 -1.70
oregon .7355245 2.39
wash_e .1208528 0.36
wash_w -.6586741 -2.14
colorado -.2641851 -0.87
kansas -.0045874 -0.02
newmex -.7683773 -2.63
okla_n .0517369 0.12
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District Coefficient z
okla_e -.0597299 -0.14
okla_w .0183979 0.05
utah -.0764252 -0.22
wyoming .1032933 0.26
virg_isl -.760547 -0.95
guam -.41143 -0.74
alaska -.4040998 -1.03
louis_m -.315164 -0.75
Logistic Regression: Black Model
District Coefficient z
Mass -.9961368 -1.82
p_rico .0598227 0.13
Conn -.5335219 -1.14
ny_n -1.667923 -2.53
ny_e 1.497301 5.13
ny_s -.3018811 -0.93
ny_w .0974149 0.28
Vermont .5355887 0.54
Del .2431307 0.49
Jersey -.5490955 -1.36
penn_e -1.079907 -3.10
penn_m .3639097 0.95
penn_w -.7729737 -1.71
Maryland -.3602156 -1.10
ncar_e -1.177304 -2.83
ncar_m -.2923266 -0.81
ncar_w -.4787389 -1.40
Scar .0189802 0.06
virg_e -1.114732 -3.73
virg_w -1.229729 -2.66
wvirg_n -2.002476 -2.54
wvirg_s -.3879302 -0.95
alab_n -1.712839 -3.21
alab_m -.474483 -0.91
alab_s .6366792 1.89
flor_n -.8836236 -1.75
flor_m -.5791494 -1.70
flor_s .5310313 1.84
georg_n -.5988826 -1.75
georg_m -.6061147 -1.59
georg_s -.2446696 -0.66
louis_e -.544355 -1.52
louis_w .166126 0.46
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District Coefficient z
miss_n -.7576677 -1.47
miss_s -.1352653 -0.38
texas_n -.3485611 -1.02
texas_e -.0648526 -0.20
texas_s -.8158025 -2.38
texas_w -.0423433 -0.12
kent_e -1.828696 -3.12
kent_w -1.913013 -2.88
mich_e -.5480882 -1.67
mich_w -.0061504 -0.01
ohio_n -.4520614 -1.39
ohio_s -.4757799 -1.14
tenn_e -.6589946 -1.59
tenn_m -.7367123 -1.76
tenn_w .0092739 0.03
illin_n .2144818 0.66
illin_c -1.722187 -2.92
illin_s -3.122925 -3.00
indi_n -.528085 -1.37
indi_s -.5546831 -0.93
wisc_e -.509005 -1.19
wisc_w -.3147447 -0.39
ark_e .5985077 1.54
ark_w -1.918958 -1.79
Minn .2361859 0.60
misso_e -.4595102 -1.29
misso_w -1.103174 -2.48
Nebraska -1.19046 -2.01
Ndakota .5897331 0.63
Sdakota .3121843 0.25
Arizona .4109479 0.86
cali_n .9003791 2.62
cali_e .8061137 1.63
cali_c -.2402056 -0.72
cali_s .6224187 1.36
Idaho 2.258675 1.56
Montana -.3303363 -0.30
Nevada -.3980357 -0.60
Oregon .3209475 0.52
wash_e -.2003286 -0.24
wash_w -1.317079 -1.97
Colorado -1.035916 -1.89
Kansas .1854038 0.48
Newmex -.7104818 -1.01
okla_e .8189589 1.06
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District Coefficient z
okla_w -.3630707 -0.73
Utah .7503487 1.03
virg_isl -.7941327 -0.74
Alaska -1.113939 -1.37
louis_m -.8244113 -1.40
Logistic Regression: White Model
District Coefficient z
maine .3165429 0.28
mass .3201167 0.29
newhamp .1344563 0.12
rhodeisl -.9025725 -0.61
p_rico .0885661 0.08
conn 1.051024 0.95
ny_n -1.123086 -0.94
ny_e 1.476007 1.40
ny_s .6032092 0.57
ny_w 1.154707 1.08
vermont 1.389616 1.28
del .218012 0.15
jersey .4827392 0.45
penn_e .0208508 0.02
penn_m 1.105184 1.03
penn_w .8352621 0.76
maryland .1962447 0.18
ncar_e .7529425 0.70
ncar_m .5738425 0.53
ncar_w .2814264 0.26
scar 1.420446 1.34
virg_e .8490826 0.80
virg_w .7268457 0.68
wvirg_n .8489351 0.78
wvirg_s 1.189552 1.11
alab_n -.2826403 -0.25
alab_m .8680465 0.78
alab_s 1.406686 1.29
flor_n -.2059746 -0.18
flor_m .4615431 0.44
flor_s 1.517186 1.45
georg_n 1.232857 1.16
georg_m 1.508728 1.39
georg_s -.6959349 -0.55
louis_e 1.552962 1.43
louis_w .5539173 0.49
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District Coefficient z
miss_n .246939 0.21
miss_s .967575 0.89
texas_n 1.306568 1.24
texas_e 1.493256 1.40
texas_s 1.001878 0.96
texas_w 1.721545 1.64
kent_e .2321742 0.22
kent_w -.4156575 -0.36
mich_e 1.188421 1.12
mich_w 1.422455 1.33
ohio_n 1.045766 0.99
ohio_s .7827164 0.72
tenn_e .3293224 0.31
tenn_m .2185797 0.20
tenn_w 1.021086 0.94
illin_n 1.487675 1.41
illin_c .1141382 0.10
illin_s -1.758991 -1.21
indi_n .82449 0.74
indi_s -.0426964 -0.04
wisc_e 1.703936 1.58
wisc_w .3158169 0.28
ark_e 1.315022 1.21
ark_w .3142722 0.26
iowa_n .5266114 0.49
iowa_s -.0614389 -0.06
minn 1.104391 1.03
misso_e .4228721 0.39
misso_w .976952 0.92
nebraska .2383805 0.22
ndakota 1.118642 1.00
sdakota 2.171191 2.02
arizona .7964237 0.76
cali_n 1.834996 1.73
cali_e 1.796386 1.70
cali_c .7702981 0.73
cali_s 1.111877 1.06
hawaii .630234 0.57
idaho 1.008623 0.90
montana 1.157826 1.07
nevada .4935364 0.46
oregon 1.865375 1.75
wash_e .880476 0.81
wash_w .462036 0.43
colorado .827156 0.78
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District Coefficient z
kansas .8359283 0.79
newmex .1520513 0.14
okla_n 1.502993 1.35
okla_e .9444542 0.84
okla_w 1.223607 1.13
utah .7615473 0.70
wyoming 1.207606 1.10
virg_isl .4903643 0.32
alaska .8757093 0.79
louis_m 1.154448 1.01
Logistic Regression: Other Race Model
District Coefficient z
mass .2568372 0.15
ny_e -.5209223 -0.33
ny_s -1.70762 -1.13
vermont .7806353 0.36
penn_m .1907365 0.12
ncar_e -1.801035 -1.00
virg_e -1.218025 -0.76
alab_s -.0258622 -0.01
flor_s -.8581716 -0.53
georg_n 1.481371 0.89
louis_e .0245248 0.01
texas_n -.4940778 -0.30
texas_e -.2353257 -0.14
texas_s -.7744687 -0.49
mich_e .787307 0.44
mich_w 1.158019 0.71
illin_n .1052103 0.07
wisc_e .640624 0.40
wisc_w -.7826304 -0.44
minn 2.105418 1.39
ndakota -.3259658 -0.21
sdakota .2632669 0.18
arizona -.6558929 -0.44
cali_n -.0395926 -0.03
cali_e .2435194 0.16
cali_c -.3768629 -0.26
cali_s .8856583 0.57
hawaii -.8684855 -0.60
idaho -.1545284 -0.09
montana -.1276174 -0.09
nevada -1.383723 -0.78
oregon -.2851613 -0.15
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District Coefficient z
wash_e 1.460298 0.90
wash_w -.9088139 -0.59
colorado .9242981 0.57
kansas .6369278 0.41
newmex -.1948769 -0.13
okla_n .2786078 0.17
okla_w -1.071395 -0.59
utah -.3463482 -0.22
wyoming -.4314575 -0.23
guam -.6062647 -0.39
alaska -1.206406 -0.67
Logistic Regression: Hispanic Model
District Coefficient z
mass 16.88158 11.77
newhamp 16.4677 10.29
p_rico 17.2523 13.86
conn 18.56793 14.14
ny_n 16.74157 11.69
ny_e 18.97136 15.41
ny_s 17.51513 14.16
ny_w 18.16856 14.05
vermont 17.99024 10.70
jersey 17.60118 13.87
penn_e 16.45662 12.55
penn_m 17.6003 12.76
penn_w 17.55423 10.81
maryland 16.79682 11.72
ncar_e 17.29566 12.91
ncar_m 17.67104 13.67
ncar_w 17.65698 13.39
scar 19.00283 13.65
virg_e 17.41426 13.39
virg_w 16.5722 10.36
wvirg_n 21.16393 9.46
wvirg_s 19.67305 13.99
alab_s 18.88127 13.79
flor_m 16.87436 13.39
flor_s 18.65609 15.19
georg_n 18.54835 14.83
georg_s 17.929 10.95
louis_e 16.73839 10.44
texas_n 18.21312 14.69
texas_e 18.63157 14.66
texas_s 17.86228 14.56
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District Coefficient z
texas_w 18.64566 15.22
mich_e 17.80819 13.65
mich_w 18.48351 14.22
ohio_n 18.81235 14.91
tenn_e 15.71551 9.81
tenn_w 18.01094 12.53
illin_n 18.83717 15.14
illin_c 16.98982 10.43
wisc_e 18.47677 14.31
ark_e 19.09523 13.52
ark_w 18.96079 13.64
iowa_n 17.71646 13.42
iowa_s 16.42855 12.04
minn 17.89897 13.78
misso_e 16.57651 10.38
misso_w 17.81268 13.85
nebraska 16.92717 13.27
ndakota 17.77357 10.94
sdakota 19.81793 13.75
arizona 17.68988 14.38
cali_n 18.99719 15.26
cali_e 19.2598 15.52
cali_c 17.58581 14.20
cali_s 18.25064 14.79
hawaii 17.61091 13.31
idaho 18.5666 13.96
montana 17.33907 10.46
nevada 17.33802 13.22
oregon 19.50432 15.26
wash_e 17.56108 13.56
wash_w 16.94082 13.26
colorado 17.69022 14.02
kansas 17.92268 14.09
newmex 16.73463 13.46
okla_w 17.28212 11.85
utah 17.96082 13.09
wyoming 18.69606 13.89
virg_isl 17.91279 10.81
alaska 18.18275 13.08
louis_m 17.97686 10.62
Logistic Regression: Non-Hispanic
District Coefficient z
maine -.8614186 -1.81
mass -.7698745 -2.15
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District Coefficient z
newhamp -1.100464 -1.88
rhodeisl -1.833833 -1.74
p_rico .1440039 0.29
conn -.6079889 -1.49
ny_n -2.215166 -3.87
ny_e .6785019 2.49
ny_s -.5479262 -1.89
ny_w .0499778 0.16
vermont .2614616 0.70
del .0410783 0.09
jersey -.7649502 -2.22
penn_e -1.097274 -3.55
penn_m .1690821 0.54
penn_w -.5822034 -1.63
maryland -.4738386 -1.54
ncar_e -.842197 -2.58
ncar_m -.4580227 -1.40
ncar_w -.7253963 -2.29
scar .0171143 0.06
virg_e -.9181566 -3.30
virg_w -.7178969 -2.18
wvirg_n -.8318269 -2.20
wvirg_s -.2327983 -0.73
alab_n -1.600732 -3.87
alab_m -.4344058 -1.12
alab_s .4232337 1.37
flor_n -1.179369 -2.99
flor_m -.5547588 -1.92
flor_s .3237776 1.20
georg_n -.3970921 -1.31
georg_m -.1841301 -0.58
georg_s -.6166476 -1.75
louis_e -.2417998 -0.77
louis_w -.0680564 -0.21
miss_n -.8446883 -1.98
miss_s -.2091623 -0.67
texas_n -.0628372 -0.22
texas_e .024083 0.08
texas_s -.411932 -1.43
texas_w .1292107 0.46
kent_e -1.105107 -3.54
kent_w -1.693404 -3.74
mich_e -.3184301 -1.10
mich_w .1744092 0.54
ohio_n -.4794306 -1.67
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District Coefficient z
ohio_s -.4287042 -1.29
tenn_e -.7238967 -2.34
tenn_m -.7389646 -2.08
tenn_w -.0909604 -0.29
illin_n .0738047 0.25
illin_c -1.407386 -3.41
illin_s -3.028159 -4.00
indi_n -.42764 -1.25
indi_s -.9269877 -2.04
wisc_e .1226294 0.37
wisc_w -.565515 -1.25
ark_e .2235516 0.68
ark_w -2.486461 -2.38
iowa_n -.8067889 -2.05
iowa_s -1.309437 -3.18
minn .4755292 1.55
misso_e -.5595086 -1.77
misso_w -.4581295 -1.54
nebraska -.8930982 -2.48
ndakota .0104493 0.03
sdakota .6062302 1.88
arizona -.1584472 -0.53
cali_n .6047728 2.06
cali_e .2974605 0.95
cali_c -.2256059 -0.81
cali_s .0092174 0.03
hawaii -.5835721 -1.69
idaho -.3680045 -0.65
montana .009144 0.03
nevada -.7501164 -2.06
oregon .3862331 1.16
wash_e .1630747 0.43
wash_w -.6582038 -2.00
colorado -.3858025 -1.16
kansas -.1276353 -0.42
newmex -.1393054 -0.42
okla_n -.0713698 -0.17
okla_e -.2623832 -0.61
okla_w -.065121 -0.19
utah -.2043924 -0.57
wyoming -.2645217 -0.57
virg_isl -1.167576 -1.08
guam -.536992 -0.95
alaska -.6780878 -1.58
louis_m -.5250894 -1.20
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Logistic Regression: Male Model
District Coefficient z
maine -.8872729 -1.85
mass -.7038725 -1.97
newhamp -.8995517 -1.68
rhodeisl -2.390899 -2.27
p_rico -.8142773 -2.39
conn -.6782591 -1.66
ny_n -1.980635 -3.75
ny_e .5393863 1.98
ny_s -.6630176 -2.33
ny_w -.0579543 -0.18
vermont .3153678 0.81
del .1816862 0.37
jersey -.8374689 -2.44
penn_e -1.140033 -3.69
penn_m .0689591 0.21
penn_w -.394838 -1.10
maryland -.4781459 -1.54
ncar_e -.7580905 -2.30
ncar_m -.4490558 -1.39
ncar_w -.5150297 -1.65
scar .023375 0.08
virg_e -.9364807 -3.30
virg_w -.6788446 -2.01
wvirg_n -.7507398 -1.80
wvirg_s -.0902429 -0.28
alab_n -1.851109 -3.97
alab_m -.420386 -1.00
alab_s .6208535 1.96
flor_n -1.518009 -3.40
flor_m -.8292067 -2.84
flor_s .258677 0.96
georg_n -.1088688 -0.37
georg_m -.1520331 -0.46
georg_s -.4605516 -1.30
louis_e -.6450242 -1.88
louis_w -.070842 -0.21
miss_n -.8785228 -1.91
miss_s -.2299389 -0.72
texas_n -.0719749 -0.26
texas_e .0112313 0.04
texas_s -.2644606 -0.98
texas_w .5018437 1.89
kent_e -1.048216 -3.24
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District Coefficient z
kent_w -1.535434 -3.36
mich_e -.3374506 -1.12
mich_w .0958156 0.28
ohio_n -.3148576 -1.09
ohio_s -.3738596 -1.09
tenn_e -.8018986 -2.54
tenn_m -1.117195 -2.87
tenn_w .0301696 0.09
illin_n .258826 0.90
illin_c -1.584878 -3.50
illin_s -2.878635 -3.79
indi_n -.7725804 -2.09
indi_s -.8758441 -1.85
wisc_e .1022195 0.31
wisc_w -.5961679 -1.31
ark_e .3650557 1.09
ark_w -.9826262 -1.68
iowa_n -.6560176 -1.75
iowa_s -1.494419 -3.64
minn .2599145 0.84
misso_e -.6855374 -2.09
misso_w -.4909249 -1.61
nebraska -1.194918 -3.32
ndakota -.0482781 -0.12
sdakota .5564123 1.63
arizona -.4116902 -1.47
cali_n .5826824 2.00
cali_e .5736967 1.93
cali_c -.3621094 -1.30
cali_s -.0354964 -0.12
hawaii -.54797 -1.54
idaho .1808133 0.40
montana -.0078754 -0.02
nevada -.8123597 -2.26
oregon .6374714 1.97
wash_e -.1772605 -0.47
wash_w -.7672261 -2.38
colorado -.5264109 -1.62
kansas -.2449521 -0.80
newmex -1.048923 -3.35
okla_n .2803924 0.65
okla_e -.0305776 -0.07
okla_w -.1927918 -0.52
utah -.301603 -0.82
wyoming .3063783 0.72
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District Coefficient z
virg_isl -.8394404 -1.03
guam -.9761952 -1.23
alaska -.4480339 -1.09
louis_m -.3699605 -0.84
Logistic Regression: Female Model
District Coefficient z
mass -.5286358 -0.35
p_rico .658011 0.56
conn 2.443725 2.08
ny_n -.7092049 -0.48
ny_e 2.922088 2.69
ny_s 1.52415 1.37
ny_w 2.117689 1.87
vermont 1.193353 0.92
del 1.003381 0.67
jersey 1.330443 1.18
penn_e .0336546 0.03
penn_m 1.870283 1.65
penn_w -.3855988 -0.26
maryland .2753224 0.21
ncar_e .376602 0.31
ncar_m 1.063325 0.89
scar 2.020744 1.84
virg_e 1.239862 1.12
virg_w .4627469 0.37
wvirg_n 1.026231 0.87
wvirg_s 1.237318 1.05
alab_n .9910952 0.81
alab_m 1.348382 1.11
alab_s 1.958877 1.71
flor_n 1.527473 1.27
flor_m 1.411433 1.27
flor_s 2.333378 2.16
georg_n .7633955 0.64
georg_m 1.340274 1.14
georg_s .0603064 0.04
louis_e 2.744569 2.43
louis_w 1.581448 1.34
miss_n 1.16081 0.87
miss_s 1.512516 1.25
texas_n 1.933776 1.77
texas_e 2.095694 1.89
texas_s 1.296834 1.19
texas_w 2.092191 1.94
88
District Coefficient z
kent_e .2037121 0.18
mich_e 1.571757 1.42
mich_w 2.173226 1.92
ohio_n 1.595502 1.44
ohio_s .4743205 0.36
tenn_e .8847606 0.75
tenn_m 2.03813 1.72
tenn_w 1.543555 1.33
illin_n 2.015006 1.81
illin_c 1.054881 0.87
indi_n 2.413786 2.08
indi_s .277757 0.19
wisc_e 2.049361 1.77
ark_e 1.824682 1.52
iowa_n .231722 0.18
iowa_s .3207547 0.26
minn 2.58308 2.26
misso_e 1.441947 1.24
misso_w 1.346196 1.20
nebraska 1.112309 0.98
ndakota 1.345385 1.00
sdakota 2.642447 2.33
arizona 1.529429 1.39
cali_n 2.816017 2.53
cali_e 2.537728 2.24
cali_c 1.392966 1.27
cali_s 1.935904 1.74
hawaii 1.152472 1.00
idaho .2926893 0.19
montana 1.232064 1.01
nevada 1.270412 1.06
oregon 2.082707 1.76
wash_e 2.063847 1.78
wash_w .516343 0.43
colorado 1.637913 1.44
kansas 1.840496 1.64
newmex 1.117278 1.00
okla_e 1.035663 0.77
okla_w 1.738406 1.49
utah 1.925756 1.59
wyoming .0490274 0.03
guam 1.8867 1.48
alaska .3472228 0.23
louis_m .636396 0.42
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Logistic Regression: Ages 17-29
District Coefficient z
maine -.27451 -0.37
mass -.2486428 -0.43
newhamp -1.900937 -1.72
p_rico -1.011211 -1.82
conn .1331298 0.22
ny_n -2.067388 -2.48
ny_e 1.216779 2.80
ny_s .1718985 0.38
ny_w .3026746 0.60
vermont .6508461 1.18
del .5681355 0.83
jersey -.433073 -0.82
penn_e -.115229 -0.25
penn_m .5177782 1.06
penn_w .4703519 0.92
maryland -.0028177 -0.01
ncar_e -.8840862 -1.69
ncar_m -.3886111 -0.79
ncar_w -.2202686 -0.45
scar .4925105 1.10
virg_e -.4394046 -0.99
virg_w -.3941523 -0.76
wvirg_n -1.519597 -1.80
wvirg_s .0106421 0.02
alab_n -1.216921 -1.83
alab_m -.5607859 -0.83
alab_s .5575266 1.16
flor_n -.8403625 -1.35
flor_m -.8255284 -1.73
flor_s .9187075 2.14
georg_n .5071855 1.09
georg_m .3821275 0.76
georg_s -.095529 -0.18
louis_e -.4236866 -0.80
louis_w -.3285833 -0.58
miss_n -.6811667 -1.01
miss_s .2102541 0.43
texas_n .1876816 0.42
texas_e .5037348 1.10
texas_s .1682872 0.39
texas_w .7949722 1.88
kent_e -.9061562 -1.69
kent_w -1.290267 -1.76
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District Coefficient z
mich_e .2432478 0.52
mich_w -.0000515 -0.00
ohio_n .4390182 0.98
ohio_s -.2544998 -0.47
tenn_e -.8560598 -1.65
tenn_m -.3283673 -0.57
tenn_w .4800196 0.98
illin_n .6731608 1.44
illin_c -.9866861 -1.57
illin_s -2.460829 -2.26
indi_n -.17693 -0.33
indi_s -.8880481 -1.06
wisc_e .6882647 1.39
wisc_w -.215088 -0.29
ark_e 1.086032 2.06
iowa_n -.1961553 -0.34
iowa_s -1.641548 -2.25
minn .6008914 1.25
misso_e -.3869571 -0.75
misso_w -.3461501 -0.70
nebraska -.5001797 -1.00
ndakota -.4625426 -0.67
sdakota .6567389 1.26
arizona -.2927657 -0.66
cali_n .751407 1.58
cali_e 1.167632 2.52
cali_c .2214625 0.50
cali_s .6432594 1.41
hawaii -.7885003 -1.28
idaho .0089326 0.01
montana .4710665 0.92
nevada -.6546436 -1.04
oregon .6885901 1.27
wash_e .1739112 0.32
wash_w -.5478739 -1.08
colorado .1093043 0.23
kansas .2981418 0.63
newmex -.9902812 -2.05
okla_n .0832831 0.11
okla_e -.4126891 -0.47
okla_w -.8209073 -1.29
utah .3290075 0.61
wyoming .3291583 0.52
virg_isl -.7223999 -0.62
alaska -.4187322 -0.65
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District Coefficient z
louis_m -.0642859 -0.10
Logistic Regression: Ages 30-49
District Coefficient z
maine -1.715581 -2.15
mass -1.431124 -2.79
newhamp -.6184479 -0.99
rhodeisl -1.868514 -1.72
p_rico -.6077163 -1.44
conn -.6193841 -1.24
ny_n -1.585955 -2.58
ny_e .5277764 1.53
ny_s -.9095853 -2.48
ny_w .0655451 0.17
vermont -.2270581 -0.39
del -.0651975 -0.10
jersey -.534381 -1.31
penn_e -1.905488 -4.22
penn_m -.0483843 -0.11
penn_w -1.852569 -2.72
maryland -.6618965 -1.58
ncar_e -.6456973 -1.51
ncar_m -.2183747 -0.51
ncar_w -.7444007 -1.80
scar -.0522345 -0.14
virg_e -.9230243 -2.53
virg_w -.9049741 -1.97
wvirg_n -.488023 -1.04
wvirg_s -.0766674 -0.18
alab_n -2.178501 -3.24
alab_m -.0812568 -0.17
alab_s .7907615 1.94
flor_n -1.081193 -2.01
flor_m -.6562897 -1.77
flor_s .2235045 0.66
georg_n -.4701676 -1.22
georg_m -.3936142 -0.91
georg_s -.6527824 -1.34
louis_e .0349972 0.09
louis_w .1029349 0.24
miss_n -.6398402 -1.08
miss_s -.2266051 -0.53
texas_n -.1778349 -0.50
texas_e .0703073 0.18
texas_s -.5197892 -1.50
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District Coefficient z
texas_w .4221999 1.25
kent_e -1.194646 -2.90
kent_w -1.564413 -2.71
mich_e -.3653563 -0.97
mich_w .2982339 0.72
ohio_n -.6544064 -1.72
ohio_s -.4517296 -1.03
tenn_e -.4530661 -1.15
tenn_m -.972318 -2.07
tenn_w -.1171054 -0.27
illin_n .4054956 1.13
illin_c -1.561036 -2.71
illin_s -3.124491 -2.95
indi_n -.6645143 -1.39
indi_s -1.188909 -1.76
wisc_e -.0406121 -0.09
wisc_w -.6880268 -1.10
ark_e -.1499257 -0.34
ark_w -.4188613 -0.67
iowa_n -1.206168 -2.33
iowa_s -1.31985 -2.72
minn .3734255 0.94
misso_e -.4838079 -1.20
misso_w -.2715205 -0.73
nebraska -1.180877 -2.55
ndakota .433195 0.87
sdakota .8349306 1.98
arizona -.2541099 -0.72
cali_n .7347074 2.04
cali_e .4409054 1.15
cali_c -.5071376 -1.42
cali_s -.097494 -0.26
hawaii -.5450975 -1.28
idaho .1146012 0.18
montana -.2796929 -0.59
nevada -.4788313 -1.13
oregon .855362 2.14
wash_e -.1704238 -0.37
wash_w -.8802998 -2.11
colorado -.6234958 -1.48
kansas -.1323694 -0.34
newmex -.645623 -1.67
okla_n -.1376441 -0.25
okla_e -.1072765 -0.19
okla_w .4148627 0.96
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District Coefficient z
utah -.3656231 -0.78
wyoming -.5070367 -0.81
virg_isl -.3231532 -0.29
guam -.0919458 -0.15
alaska -.4272136 -0.81
louis_m -1.92499 -1.80
Logistic Regression: Ages 50+
District Coefficient z
maine 1.125719 0.78
mass 1.320657 1.08
p_rico .624451 0.50
conn 1.157227 0.90
ny_e 1.821759 1.60
ny_s .348077 0.30
ny_w .9060633 0.74
vermont 1.736148 1.24
jersey -.6323409 -0.47
penn_e -.6215918 -0.50
penn_m 1.302175 1.08
penn_w .6190067 0.48
maryland .2378727 0.19
ncar_e 1.116319 0.89
ncar_m .8929653 0.70
ncar_w 1.007644 0.73
scar 1.314378 1.12
virg_e -.1546181 -0.13
virg_w .6190936 0.50
wvirg_n 1.119327 0.83
wvirg_s 1.119716 0.93
alab_n .399154 0.31
alab_m .7428615 0.48
alab_s 2.018001 1.58
flor_n -1.006198 -0.66
flor_m .9931697 0.86
flor_s 1.142467 1.00
georg_n .6238696 0.51
georg_m .7993213 0.62
georg_s .476487 0.31
louis_e .965807 0.73
louis_w 1.720412 1.40
miss_n .6899518 0.44
miss_s .3211486 0.25
texas_n 1.692342 1.47
texas_e 1.070189 0.88
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District Coefficient z
texas_s 1.03047 0.90
texas_w 1.588057 1.38
kent_e .0622974 0.05
mich_e .4065968 0.34
mich_w 1.952015 1.62
ohio_n .2209467 0.19
ohio_s .621001 0.48
tenn_e -.3798964 -0.30
tenn_m .7041901 0.51
tenn_w .3860008 0.30
illin_n .2560894 0.22
illin_c -.1449006 -0.10
indi_n 1.344868 1.00
indi_s .6800659 0.51
wisc_e .7934453 0.58
wisc_w -.0920766 -0.06
ark_e 1.736955 1.40
iowa_n 1.63865 1.21
iowa_s .2312847 0.17
minn 1.413999 1.13
misso_e -.8159354 -0.54
misso_w .0058277 0.00
nebraska -1.008761 -0.66
ndakota .5881441 0.36
sdakota 1.955555 1.56
arizona .8139855 0.70
cali_n 1.774213 1.48
cali_e 1.333323 1.10
cali_c .5980916 0.52
cali_s .3170641 0.26
hawaii 1.039194 0.84
idaho 2.221705 1.37
montana .3839969 0.28
nevada -.9123007 -0.60
oregon 1.078653 0.86
wash_e 1.868523 1.40
wash_w .446769 0.36
colorado .1667385 0.13
kansas .0646076 0.05
newmex .1503485 0.12
okla_n 1.584479 1.12
okla_e .9385818 0.70
okla_w .9432448 0.67
utah .2693779 0.18
wyoming 2.094562 1.52
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District Coefficient z
alaska .088456 0.06
louis_m 1.809846 1.40
OLS Regression: Full Model
District Coefficient t
maine .9945715 0.85
mass 1.517492 1.51
newhamp 1.558182 1.24
rhodeisl 2.30747 1.64
p_rico 1.852123 1.95
conn .3455112 0.32
ny_n 2.303181 2.26
ny_e -2.848569 -3.24
ny_s .0834912 0.10
ny_w -1.701285 -1.76
vermont -2.599251 -1.93
del -.4732509 -0.31
jersey .3371202 0.37
penn_e 2.141664 2.37
penn_m -1.652875 -1.64
penn_w 1.151252 1.11
maryland 1.090087 1.16
ncar_e 1.294808 1.36
ncar_m 2.208643 2.26
ncar_w .6493709 0.67
scar -.8147837 -0.90
virg_e 1.599979 1.84
virg_w 1.444758 1.44
wvirg_n 1.861515 1.57
wvirg_s -1.639177 -1.62
alab_n 2.187494 2.21
alab_m .507152 0.43
alab_s -2.503715 -2.38
flor_n 1.373889 1.34
flor_m 1.695876 1.94
flor_s -.5109643 -0.60
georg_n .7096846 0.77
georg_m -.2299827 -0.23
georg_s 1.191384 1.09
louis_e .2864118 0.30
louis_w -2.071596 -1.92
miss_n 1.26021 1.04
miss_s .4726562 0.48
texas_n -.6378763 -0.73
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District Coefficient t
texas_e -1.722407 -1.84
texas_s .4637742 0.55
texas_w -1.648681 -1.96
kent_e 1.2463 1.33
kent_w 1.147897 1.10
mich_e .2342991 0.26
mich_w -1.306713 -1.28
ohio_n .0332294 0.04
ohio_s -.3078462 -0.30
tenn_e 1.089366 1.15
tenn_m 1.015861 0.92
tenn_w -.9054117 -0.90
illin_n -1.806043 -2.00
illin_c 1.65946 1.61
illin_s 2.708288 2.70
indi_n -.562476 -0.54
indi_s 1.551602 1.37
wisc_e -4.186684 -3.94
wisc_w 1.010651 0.83
ark_e -3.400389 -3.06
ark_w 1.385389 1.10
iowa_n 1.577409 1.53
iowa_s 1.548982 1.49
minn -.7638975 -0.76
misso_e .9903363 1.06
misso_w .1348274 0.15
nebraska 1.463715 1.52
ndakota -.0234016 -0.02
sdakota -.9808702 -0.89
arizona -.0084167 -0.01
cali_n -3.598829 -3.81
cali_e -4.959709 -5.02
cali_c .2338238 0.27
cali_s .6985893 0.79
hawaii .9369695 0.90
idaho 1.000611 0.71
montana .2908496 0.26
nevada .506584 0.53
oregon .1393031 0.13
wash_e -.4125774 -0.39
wash_w .7143488 0.74
colorado -.1903236 -0.20
kansas -1.577609 -1.62
newmex .8057914 0.91
okla_n -2.217855 -1.65
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District Coefficient t
okla_e -.6168475 -0.43
okla_w -1.700616 -1.49
utah -.0764437 -0.07
wyoming -2.875071 -2.20
virg_isl 1.162176 0.61
guam .6821887 0.43
mari_isl 3.22156 0.81
alaska .0830149 0.07
louis_m -.0170338 -0.01
OLS Regression: Black Model
District Coefficient t
maine 3.665547 0.74
mass 1.406228 0.86
newhamp 2.065747 0.72
rhodeisl 3.6909 1.42
p_rico .4191985 0.26
conn 1.195603 0.76
ny_n 2.235989 1.34
ny_e -6.302544 -5.14
ny_s -.2378126 -0.20
ny_w -2.299369 -1.67
vermont -3.316033 -0.77
del -.7828999 -0.38
jersey -.0434555 -0.03
penn_e 1.820035 1.49
penn_m -3.474634 -2.15
penn_w 2.388499 1.59
maryland 1.113906 0.91
ncar_e 1.742788 1.32
ncar_m 3.030044 2.23
ncar_w .7393526 0.57
scar -.481468 -0.40
virg_e 2.583302 2.30
virg_w 2.173501 1.45
wvirg_n 6.99061 3.23
wvirg_s -2.191415 -1.37
alab_n 3.280461 2.37
alab_m .1279951 0.07
alab_s -2.481347 -1.73
flor_n 1.360614 0.86
flor_m 1.659655 1.35
flor_s -.6318224 -0.55
georg_n 1.957786 1.57
georg_m .2536392 0.18
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District Coefficient t
georg_s 1.43284 0.96
louis_e 1.23579 0.97
louis_w -3.46945 -2.31
miss_n 1.388813 0.81
miss_s .5924555 0.44
texas_n .149631 0.12
texas_e -1.500665 -1.16
texas_s 1.060409 0.89
texas_w -1.083169 -0.83
kent_e 2.162593 1.40
kent_w 1.580317 0.98
mich_e .8915013 0.73
mich_w -1.428236 -0.82
ohio_n 1.234497 1.00
ohio_s -.15371 -0.10
tenn_e .0943601 0.06
tenn_m .6886952 0.42
tenn_w -.6540053 -0.47
illin_n -1.80631 -1.42
illin_c 1.793507 1.20
illin_s 2.87189 2.07
indi_n -1.09437 -0.79
indi_s 2.678291 1.39
wisc_e 1.3432 0.88
wisc_w 1.077664 0.38
ark_e -7.166401 -4.31
ark_w 2.94758 1.30
iowa_n 2.531749 1.01
iowa_s 4.565809 2.09
minn -1.075573 -0.65
misso_e .9521727 0.75
misso_w 1.509133 1.10
nebraska 1.191461 0.69
ndakota 1.668178 0.36
sdakota 1.783401 0.36
arizona -.2369978 -0.12
cali_n -4.331816 -2.93
cali_e -1.356879 -0.60
cali_c .043179 0.03
cali_s -3.01069 -1.63
hawaii 3.863132 1.16
idaho -.2578119 -0.03
montana 1.170364 0.31
nevada .7833803 0.38
oregon -1.179514 -0.48
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District Coefficient t
wash_e -.2582978 -0.09
wash_w .9920026 0.56
colorado 1.599819 0.93
kansas -4.164718 -2.56
newmex .3779018 0.16
okla_n 2.53146 0.92
okla_e -13.62096 -3.50
okla_w -5.003083 -2.44
utah -4.196142 -1.30
wyoming 3.721438 0.54
virg_isl 2.042142 0.72
alaska -.3901727 -0.15
louis_m .3392842 0.20
OLS Regression: White Model
District Coefficient t
maine .0978509 0.05
mass .9413774 0.45
newhamp .8166519 0.37
rhodeisl .9084611 0.39
p_rico 1.495363 0.73
conn -.954752 -0.44
ny_n 1.673855 0.80
ny_e -1.767125 -0.88
ny_s -.4542673 -0.23
ny_w -1.749192 -0.84
vermont -3.548361 -1.59
del .1084496 0.04
jersey -.1963009 -0.10
penn_e 1.891411 0.93
penn_m -1.538598 -0.74
penn_w -.6077768 -0.28
maryland .6053137 0.28
ncar_e .0010289 0.00
ncar_m .6707805 0.32
ncar_w .0084332 0.00
scar -1.842397 -0.90
virg_e -.3017129 -0.15
virg_w .3392504 0.16
wvirg_n -.8129614 -0.37
wvirg_s -1.945965 -0.93
alab_n .4983212 0.24
alab_m .2603528 0.12
alab_s -3.147186 -1.42
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District Coefficient t
flor_n .6516318 0.31
flor_m 1.017947 0.51
flor_s -1.192274 -0.60
georg_n -.8933814 -0.44
georg_m -1.500532 -0.69
georg_s .733249 0.32
louis_e -2.227449 -1.03
louis_w -.529178 -0.24
miss_n .5521538 0.24
miss_s -.3531801 -0.17
texas_n -1.510599 -0.75
texas_e -2.386657 -1.16
texas_s -.2298648 -0.12
texas_w -2.298494 -1.16
kent_e .2365897 0.12
kent_w .4256833 0.20
mich_e -1.091477 -0.53
mich_w -1.854081 -0.89
ohio_n -1.505512 -0.74
ohio_s -1.133494 -0.54
tenn_e .6911874 0.34
tenn_m .8998981 0.41
tenn_w -1.629864 -0.76
illin_n -2.566315 -1.27
illin_c .7740635 0.36
illin_s 1.872359 0.88
indi_n -.0651309 -0.03
indi_s .4163519 0.19
wisc_e -10.88924 -4.99
wisc_w .5713067 0.26
ark_e -.9571251 -0.44
ark_w .215007 0.10
iowa_n .7733763 0.37
iowa_s .2157363 0.10
minn -.6329901 -0.30
misso_e .4156044 0.20
misso_w -1.235437 -0.61
nebraska .7872722 0.39
ndakota -.6705627 -0.29
sdakota -2.052887 -0.93
arizona -.6693849 -0.34
cali_n -4.026023 -1.96
cali_e -6.037546 -2.95
cali_c -.3307249 -0.17
cali_s .2692885 0.13
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District Coefficient t
hawaii -.4092874 -0.19
idaho .2306305 0.10
montana -1.471435 -0.68
nevada -.2636806 -0.13
oregon -.6578556 -0.32
wash_e -.41497 -0.20
wash_w -.0081179 -0.00
colorado -1.10151 -0.54
kansas -1.004315 -0.49
newmex .3422902 0.17
okla_n -4.532296 -1.96
okla_e -.324838 -0.14
okla_w -.9380379 -0.43
utah -.3303842 -0.16
wyoming -3.932858 -1.78
virg_isl -1.229193 -0.37
guam .3985882 0.07
mari_isl -2.134667 -0.22
alaska -.7128976 -0.33
louis_m -1.06773 -0.46
OLS Regression: Other Race Model
District Coefficient t
maine 3.522393 0.46
mass .5154112 0.08
newhamp 2.746141 0.25
rhodeisl 3.417104 0.39
p_rico 3.448353 0.31
conn 5.211954 0.47
ny_n 1.059754 0.17
ny_e -.0403819 -0.01
ny_s .5148827 0.09
ny_w 1.476831 0.22
vermont 3.051039 0.35
del -4.662378 -0.43
jersey 2.156093 0.36
penn_e 3.457145 0.56
penn_m .6129985 0.10
maryland 1.354913 0.19
ncar_e 3.086933 0.52
ncar_m 1.564205 0.23
ncar_w 3.939027 0.54
scar 2.900753 0.40
virg_e 1.113546 0.19
virg_w 5.572555 0.72
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District Coefficient t
wvirg_n 2.886088 0.26
wvirg_s .5815219 0.08
alab_s 7.474851 1.03
flor_n 3.817341 0.49
flor_m 2.702473 0.45
flor_s 2.887618 0.49
georg_n 1.294312 0.21
georg_m -3.763536 -0.35
louis_e -1.582712 -0.25
louis_w 4.819245 0.56
miss_n .6194791 0.06
miss_s 1.767845 0.29
texas_n -.3890235 -0.07
texas_e -4.013338 -0.63
texas_s 2.153866 0.37
texas_w 2.840051 0.43
kent_e 3.633831 0.50
kent_w -3.469127 -0.48
mich_e .7866424 0.13
mich_w -1.860075 -0.30
ohio_n 3.082643 0.46
ohio_s 3.585992 0.50
tenn_e 8.134027 0.74
tenn_m 4.042143 0.47
illin_n 1.276325 0.22
indi_n 5.683033 0.66
indi_s .5801848 0.05
wisc_e -.663187 -0.11
wisc_w -.5017115 -0.08
ark_e 2.981455 0.39
iowa_n 6.746883 0.62
iowa_s 4.308743 0.50
minn -3.596729 -0.62
misso_e 1.375792 0.20
misso_w 2.567246 0.33
nebraska 2.715768 0.44
ndakota -.1142834 -0.02
sdakota -.4371996 -0.08
arizona .6140497 0.11
cali_n -2.178431 -0.39
cali_e -5.611929 -0.96
cali_c .3479938 0.06
cali_s -2.909682 -0.48
hawaii 1.601303 0.29
idaho 1.804761 0.30
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District Coefficient t
montana 2.202677 0.39
nevada 1.073008 0.19
oregon 4.245675 0.64
wash_e -9.931646 -1.60
wash_w .5053595 0.09
colorado -5.516065 -0.90
kansas -6.872797 -1.15
newmex -2.026128 -0.36
okla_n -2.406986 -0.39
okla_e 8.005182 1.26
okla_w -1.248026 -0.20
utah -.3309497 -0.06
wyoming -1.496084 -0.23
virg_isl 1.070871 0.14
guam .7208941 0.13
mari_isl 4.418788 0.66
alaska 1.2579 0.21
louis_m 2.157565 0.25
OLS Regression: Hispanic Model
District Coefficient t
maine .0865225 0.02
mass .4320721 0.15
newhamp .3558391 0.12
rhodeisl -1.076134 -0.37
p_rico -.8167173 -0.33
conn -3.413917 -1.16
ny_n -1.631373 -0.60
ny_e -5.536187 -2.21
ny_s -2.242207 -0.90
ny_w -4.074638 -1.47
vermont -2.879105 -0.69
del -.9383443 -0.13
jersey -1.945526 -0.76
penn_e 1.142378 0.44
penn_m -5.187953 -1.76
penn_w -2.188463 -0.65
maryland -2.746743 -0.94
ncar_e -1.867292 -0.67
ncar_m -1.609931 -0.61
ncar_w -2.295758 -0.81
scar -6.980308 -1.98
virg_e -1.151105 -0.43
virg_w .9446131 0.30
wvirg_n -17.83675 -2.50
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District Coefficient t
wvirg_s -7.19622 -1.91
alab_n 3.711767 1.03
alab_m -8.358822 -1.57
alab_s -8.48645 -2.45
flor_n .3096889 0.10
flor_m -.5421894 -0.22
flor_s -3.875113 -1.56
georg_n -3.339906 -1.30
georg_m -1.474486 -0.43
georg_s -4.850211 -1.32
louis_e -1.924817 -0.64
louis_w -.5189907 -0.13
miss_n -3.392131 -0.35
miss_s -.6603303 -0.19
texas_n -3.286819 -1.31
texas_e -5.817915 -2.19
texas_s -2.177545 -0.88
texas_w -4.296575 -1.75
kent_e -.0154901 -0.01
kent_w -2.743374 -0.83
mich_e -1.259181 -0.45
mich_w -2.20876 -0.81
ohio_n -5.217533 -1.94
ohio_s -.0217023 -0.01
tenn_e -.3211555 -0.11
tenn_m .2979112 0.10
tenn_w -1.7766 -0.59
illin_n -6.229575 -2.44
illin_c -3.015153 -0.96
illin_s 1.226548 0.36
indi_n .5701988 0.17
indi_s .0238871 0.01
wisc_e -19.12094 -6.61
wisc_w .6975897 0.20
ark_e -4.290716 -1.17
ark_w -2.725668 -0.90
iowa_n -2.630641 -0.98
iowa_s -.4971235 -0.19
minn -2.622402 -0.96
misso_e -.3204255 -0.11
misso_w -2.709055 -1.01
nebraska -.8332899 -0.32
ndakota -2.575077 -0.74
sdakota -3.399758 -0.88
arizona -2.572945 -1.04
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District Coefficient t
cali_n -6.796944 -2.65
cali_e -12.8476 -4.93
cali_c -1.786271 -0.72
cali_s -1.504859 -0.61
hawaii -2.257016 -0.79
idaho -1.752977 -0.58
montana -2.199013 -0.58
nevada -2.540492 -0.99
oregon -1.190954 -0.43
wash_e -2.915067 -1.12
wash_w -.1100969 -0.04
colorado -2.561824 -0.99
kansas -3.120722 -1.18
newmex -1.398355 -0.56
okla_n 2.275532 0.23
okla_w -1.506213 -0.47
utah -3.060723 -1.14
wyoming -14.80487 -4.78
virg_isl -3.185963 -0.82
alaska -2.676534 -0.84
louis_m -4.026245 -0.88
OLS Regression: Non-Hispanic Model
District Coefficient t
maine 1.113962 0.88
mass 1.560376 1.42
newhamp 1.412257 0.99
rhodeisl 3.080748 1.70
p_rico -.3994224 -0.23
conn .8832882 0.74
ny_n 2.549147 2.22
ny_e -2.601098 -2.65
ny_s .2108592 0.22
ny_w -1.47 -1.39
vermont -2.648326 -1.81
del -.2142815 -0.13
jersey .412865 0.41
penn_e 2.193278 2.22
penn_m -1.241996 -1.13
penn_w 1.545851 1.37
maryland 1.516504 1.49
ncar_e 1.643998 1.58
ncar_m 2.841564 2.61
ncar_w 1.023542 0.98
scar -.3453341 -0.35
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District Coefficient t
virg_e 1.916546 2.04
virg_w 1.557793 1.44
wvirg_n 2.364607 1.87
wvirg_s -1.29384 -1.19
alab_n 2.395846 2.25
alab_m .9723597 0.77
alab_s -1.857776 -1.64
flor_n 1.503474 1.35
flor_m 1.701594 1.77
flor_s -.0160715 -0.02
georg_n 1.591959 1.56
georg_m -.043191 -0.04
georg_s 1.778224 1.51
louis_e .5607269 0.53
louis_w -1.953495 -1.69
miss_n 1.628553 1.27
miss_s .7636026 0.73
texas_n -.2720878 -0.28
texas_e -1.124697 -1.10
texas_s .9610354 1.00
texas_w -.7080098 -0.73
kent_e 1.410544 1.40
kent_w 1.526905 1.35
mich_e .507234 0.51
mich_w -1.490177 -1.31
ohio_n .6839067 0.70
ohio_s -.2109326 -0.19
tenn_e 1.203463 1.16
tenn_m 1.008201 0.83
tenn_w -.7118039 -0.65
illin_n -.8195262 -0.82
illin_c 2.104899 1.89
illin_s 2.888463 2.67
indi_n -.6118489 -0.55
indi_s 1.837801 1.49
wisc_e -1.402154 -1.19
wisc_w 1.045719 0.78
ark_e -3.156613 -2.63
ark_w 2.090066 1.45
iowa_n 2.365959 2.02
iowa_s 1.483753 1.23
minn -.6657756 -0.59
misso_e 1.159383 1.15
misso_w .4402508 0.44
nebraska 1.552188 1.41
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District Coefficient t
ndakota .1344489 0.10
sdakota -.720022 -0.61
arizona -.0322158 -0.03
cali_n -2.932031 -2.74
cali_e -1.915419 -1.69
cali_c .0886845 0.09
cali_s -.0642291 -0.06
hawaii 1.329589 1.15
idaho 1.430869 0.82
montana .4952376 0.41
nevada 1.132723 1.03
oregon .0541538 0.05
wash_e -.0622572 -0.05
wash_w .4551269 0.42
colorado -.0915824 -0.08
kansas -1.688771 -1.54
newmex -.5276508 -0.46
okla_n -2.016795 -1.42
okla_e -.2444847 -0.16
okla_w -1.856582 -1.48
utah .3092114 0.27
wyoming .4334364 0.29
virg_isl 2.07696 0.91
guam .9143725 0.55
mari_isl 3.370813 0.82
alaska .3248324 0.25
louis_m .4398436 0.35
OLS Regression: Male Model
District Coefficient t
maine 1.343204 1.03
mass 1.87653 1.67
newhamp 1.518211 1.08
rhodeisl 2.67364 1.77
p_rico 2.204517 2.07
conn 1.022234 0.85
ny_n 2.610429 2.27
ny_e -1.956974 -1.99
ny_s .5842852 0.60
ny_w -.9531178 -0.88
vermont -2.866943 -1.90
del -.4453871 -0.25
jersey .8029812 0.78
penn_e 2.528119 2.51
penn_m -1.203847 -1.06
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District Coefficient t
penn_w 1.460972 1.25
maryland 1.389836 1.33
ncar_e 1.717416 1.60
ncar_m 2.615486 2.41
ncar_w .6307561 0.59
scar -.6158415 -0.61
virg_e 2.191427 2.26
virg_w 1.69494 1.51
wvirg_n 2.39436 1.76
wvirg_s -1.64817 -1.45
alab_n 2.836791 2.55
alab_m 1.229709 0.90
alab_s -2.58192 -2.17
flor_n 2.059536 1.80
flor_m 2.12157 2.18
flor_s .1887249 0.20
georg_n 1.15323 1.12
georg_m .1608699 0.14
georg_s 1.423862 1.18
louis_e 1.260247 1.17
louis_w -1.915356 -1.57
miss_n 1.67612 1.25
miss_s .9146122 0.84
texas_n -.2483692 -0.25
texas_e -.8285214 -0.79
texas_s .7839654 0.84
texas_w -1.06381 -1.13
kent_e 1.369233 1.30
kent_w 1.741323 1.47
mich_e .5600698 0.54
mich_w -.0154728 -0.01
ohio_n .4316307 0.43
ohio_s -.3254853 -0.28
tenn_e 1.37326 1.30
tenn_m 2.223125 1.81
tenn_w -.6179354 -0.54
illin_n -1.538019 -1.52
illin_c 2.192922 1.89
illin_s 2.625852 2.36
indi_n -.3114236 -0.27
indi_s 2.029398 1.59
wisc_e -4.816891 -4.02
wisc_w 1.395036 1.02
ark_e -3.25653 -2.61
ark_w 1.782472 1.25
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District Coefficient t
iowa_n 1.775908 1.55
iowa_s 1.726676 1.49
minn -.3590482 -0.32
misso_e 1.437289 1.38
misso_w .4898595 0.48
nebraska 1.795011 1.67
ndakota .0349488 0.02
sdakota -.9487925 -0.75
arizona .3737867 0.39
cali_n -3.578429 -3.39
cali_e -4.884123 -4.43
cali_c .5148751 0.53
cali_s 1.203886 1.22
hawaii 1.223637 1.04
idaho 1.340908 0.85
montana .4863437 0.39
nevada .9835471 0.92
oregon .4861266 0.41
wash_e .0630347 0.05
wash_w 1.182757 1.10
colorado .2498731 0.23
kansas -1.15043 -1.05
newmex 1.292032 1.31
okla_n -3.15744 -1.99
okla_e -1.129298 -0.67
okla_w -1.625116 -1.25
utah .3266932 0.29
wyoming -4.443515 -2.94
virg_isl 1.523636 0.72
guam .8208241 0.43
mari_isl 4.290446 0.80
alaska .1621363 0.12
louis_m .1522459 0.11
OLS Regression: Female Model
District Coefficient t
maine -.8357 -0.31
mass .1619362 0.08
newhamp 1.664725 0.65
rhodeisl 1.234049 0.27
p_rico .8102424 0.41
conn -2.944116 -1.26
ny_n .6297877 0.31
ny_e -6.83155 -3.74
ny_s -2.516581 -1.35
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District Coefficient t
ny_w -5.387003 -2.68
vermont -.2062018 -0.07
del -1.648672 -0.63
jersey -1.39072 -0.75
penn_e 1.036592 0.54
penn_m -3.317655 -1.63
penn_w .4367085 0.20
maryland .0962135 0.05
ncar_e -.7842847 -0.40
ncar_m .386879 0.18
ncar_w 1.822688 0.88
scar -1.513398 -0.82
virg_e -1.310894 -0.72
virg_w .3360437 0.16
wvirg_n -.5484142 -0.24
wvirg_s -1.225868 -0.59
alab_n -.7897321 -0.39
alab_m -2.033595 -0.89
alab_s -3.06536 -1.47
flor_n -2.260746 -1.02
flor_m -.2146406 -0.12
flor_s -3.60021 -2.04
georg_n -1.155595 -0.60
georg_m -2.156246 -1.04
georg_s 1.167421 0.47
louis_e -5.015695 -2.41
louis_w -3.143819 -1.47
miss_n -.9099501 -0.34
miss_s -1.726553 -0.81
texas_n -2.382987 -1.33
texas_e -6.200746 -3.17
texas_s -.661749 -0.37
texas_w -4.243327 -2.43
kent_e 1.004695 0.53
kent_w -1.492992 -0.72
mich_e -.8173419 -0.44
mich_w -6.654054 -3.24
ohio_n -1.864819 -1.01
ohio_s -.593218 -0.29
tenn_e .0816899 0.04
tenn_m -6.102041 -2.52
tenn_w -2.544861 -1.27
illin_n -2.998902 -1.60
illin_c -.8941173 -0.43
illin_s 4.549244 2.04
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District Coefficient t
indi_n -2.020022 -0.92
indi_s -.2377211 -0.11
wisc_e -1.748635 -0.81
wisc_w -.8456732 -0.32
ark_e -4.214287 -1.85
ark_w -.5596673 -0.22
iowa_n 1.110276 0.49
iowa_s 1.370439 0.60
minn -2.625711 -1.18
misso_e -1.289423 -0.66
misso_w -1.171705 -0.61
nebraska -.0460143 -0.02
ndakota -.0823939 -0.03
sdakota -1.723104 -0.82
arizona -1.851828 -1.02
cali_n -3.331766 -1.69
cali_e -5.391745 -2.59
cali_c -.918766 -0.51
cali_s -2.298661 -1.23
hawaii -.4264686 -0.21
idaho -.1833183 -0.06
montana -.6476625 -0.28
nevada -1.434679 -0.70
oregon -1.853257 -0.84
wash_e -2.102613 -0.91
wash_w -1.537911 -0.78
colorado -1.943408 -0.95
kansas -3.286525 -1.62
newmex -1.525402 -0.81
okla_n -1.116901 -0.47
okla_e -.1911633 -0.08
okla_w -2.260283 -1.02
utah -1.698341 -0.73
wyoming 1.493307 0.62
virg_isl -.8178376 -0.19
guam -1.424532 -0.55
mari_isl .3783761 0.07
alaska -.3775247 -0.17
louis_m -.8792391 -0.37
OLS Regression: Ages 17-29 Model
District Coefficient t
maine 1.176045 0.56
mass 1.749134 0.94
newhamp 3.501964 1.63
112
District Coefficient t
rhodeisl 4.60454 1.82
p_rico 3.792183 2.33
conn .8882408 0.44
ny_n 3.322138 1.92
ny_e -2.582589 -1.68
ny_s -.6309683 -0.41
ny_w -.5081157 -0.30
vermont -.6134499 -0.28
del -.0116114 -0.00
jersey 1.100918 0.69
penn_e 1.609738 1.02
penn_m -1.707728 -0.98
penn_w 1.022714 0.56
maryland 1.449064 0.90
ncar_e 2.919537 1.82
ncar_m 3.695844 2.28
ncar_w 1.854382 1.13
scar -1.129722 -0.73
virg_e 3.104741 2.08
virg_w 1.511259 0.88
wvirg_n 5.73822 2.70
wvirg_s -.4725544 -0.27
alab_n 4.516897 2.52
alab_m 2.731841 1.34
alab_s -.7366972 -0.43
flor_n 1.613585 0.92
flor_m 3.181256 2.10
flor_s -.4221572 -0.28
georg_n -.2125651 -0.13
georg_m .1688412 0.10
georg_s 2.3771 1.31
louis_e 1.873911 1.13
louis_w -.3269185 -0.18
miss_n 2.902752 1.47
miss_s 1.290343 0.77
texas_n .3947161 0.26
texas_e -.7320478 -0.46
texas_s 1.189009 0.82
texas_w -.8544515 -0.59
kent_e 1.500029 0.90
kent_w .647669 0.37
mich_e .9160156 0.57
mich_w .3683515 0.21
ohio_n .4675731 0.30
ohio_s .4669228 0.27
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District Coefficient t
tenn_e 3.261438 1.98
tenn_m 1.634516 0.85
tenn_w -1.107183 -0.65
illin_n -.8327678 -0.52
illin_c 2.019124 1.16
illin_s 3.285891 1.90
indi_n -.0640031 -0.04
indi_s 2.55288 1.25
wisc_e -7.499767 -4.19
wisc_w 2.178728 0.99
ark_e -4.600396 -2.27
ark_w 2.952629 1.35
iowa_n 2.403596 1.34
iowa_s 2.938672 1.63
minn -.6665578 -0.38
misso_e 1.779899 1.09
misso_w 1.460381 0.92
nebraska 2.202648 1.34
ndakota .4718962 0.22
sdakota -.3751024 -0.20
arizona 1.052398 0.71
cali_n -5.18048 -3.06
cali_e -7.082412 -4.15
cali_c .6966893 0.46
cali_s 1.243015 0.81
hawaii 2.833173 1.48
idaho 1.405745 0.61
montana .1772141 0.10
nevada 1.298998 0.76
oregon 2.281536 1.19
wash_e .8260367 0.45
wash_w 2.177883 1.31
colorado .0003479 0.00
kansas -1.820187 -1.09
newmex 2.179504 1.44
okla_n -1.986527 -0.80
okla_e -.3091862 -0.11
okla_w 2.48789 1.27
utah .1145816 0.06
wyoming -7.008395 -3.03
virg_isl 2.101854 0.68
guam 1.306253 0.39
mari_isl 7.511006 0.94
alaska .3438962 0.17
louis_m .3691601 0.19
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OLS Regression: Ages 30-49 Model
District Coefficient t
maine .6809266 0.43
mass 1.292014 0.97
newhamp .0775843 0.05
rhodeisl .6966225 0.38
p_rico -.0495424 -0.04
conn .3966135 0.27
ny_n 1.106478 0.79
ny_e -2.952232 -2.48
ny_s .2429569 0.21
ny_w -2.721834 -2.09
vermont -4.461196 -2.24
del -1.181311 -0.58
jersey -.4729636 -0.38
penn_e 2.230097 1.83
penn_m -1.775015 -1.27
penn_w 1.715649 1.19
maryland .8209031 0.64
ncar_e -.0828641 -0.06
ncar_m .5462983 0.40
ncar_w -.1447399 -0.11
scar -.3342947 -0.27
virg_e .5423875 0.46
virg_w 1.816676 1.31
wvirg_n -.1536778 -0.10
wvirg_s -2.744856 -1.96
alab_n 1.049226 0.79
alab_m -1.038613 -0.64
alab_s -4.805222 -3.21
flor_n .6918346 0.48
flor_m .765914 0.64
flor_s -.8473646 -0.73
georg_n 1.178184 0.96
georg_m -.7171714 -0.52
georg_s .5012846 0.33
louis_e -1.05268 -0.80
louis_w -2.895785 -1.94
miss_n -.5779656 -0.34
miss_s -.270744 -0.20
texas_n -1.441474 -1.22
texas_e -2.912354 -2.26
texas_s -.1261985 -0.11
texas_w -2.315486 -2.03
kent_e .9484768 0.75
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District Coefficient t
kent_w 1.548613 1.07
mich_e -.352011 -0.29
mich_w -2.817918 -2.03
ohio_n -.308649 -0.25
ohio_s -1.06065 -0.77
tenn_e -.8486273 -0.65
tenn_m .5908738 0.40
tenn_w -1.022986 -0.73
illin_n -3.395664 -2.79
illin_c 1.404567 0.99
illin_s 2.520848 1.84
indi_n -1.202916 -0.83
indi_s .9231345 0.61
wisc_e -2.079418 -1.40
wisc_w .172594 0.10
ark_e -3.263426 -2.17
ark_w .3029454 0.18
iowa_n 1.049346 0.77
iowa_s .2383821 0.17
minn -.9922327 -0.72
misso_e .2388359 0.19
misso_w -1.319744 -1.06
nebraska .7340562 0.55
ndakota -.6207789 -0.35
sdakota -1.853159 -1.21
arizona -.8811035 -0.76
cali_n -2.972934 -2.37
cali_e -3.232049 -2.39
cali_c -.4295151 -0.37
cali_s .035826 0.03
hawaii -.0155393 -0.01
idaho .7562262 0.38
montana .3618077 0.23
nevada -.2582847 -0.20
oregon -1.489344 -1.06
wash_e -1.10238 -0.79
wash_w -.1851315 -0.14
colorado -.2910333 -0.22
kansas -2.203564 -1.66
newmex -.4884445 -0.41
okla_n -2.612248 -1.45
okla_e -1.329158 -0.70
okla_w -5.529358 -3.57
utah -.5264246 -0.38
wyoming -.7285672 -0.42
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District Coefficient t
virg_isl .1170732 0.04
guam -.7408904 -0.37
mari_isl 1.388443 0.30
alaska -.4184911 -0.26
louis_m -.4141658 -0.24
OLS Regression: Ages 50+ Model
District Coefficient t
maine .738728 0.26
mass 1.097517 0.48
newhamp 1.448498 0.44
rhodeisl 3.894492 0.97
p_rico 2.865371 1.21
conn -.0387192 -0.02
ny_n 3.408843 1.37
ny_e -2.965412 -1.42
ny_s 1.035081 0.50
ny_w -1.118099 -0.49
vermont -2.176499 -0.69
del 2.295986 0.61
jersey 1.598765 0.75
penn_e 3.154445 1.48
penn_m -.4742586 -0.21
penn_w .1589002 0.07
maryland 1.496052 0.66
ncar_e .098282 0.04
ncar_m 3.228865 1.32
ncar_w -.6672347 -0.26
scar -.7259157 -0.33
virg_e .9406788 0.44
virg_w .2903891 0.12
wvirg_n -1.348455 -0.47
wvirg_s -.9578935 -0.41
alab_n 1.520271 0.67
alab_m -.5239849 -0.18
alab_s -1.145546 -0.43
flor_n 3.276907 1.41
flor_m 1.200757 0.58
flor_s .3296834 0.16
georg_n 1.482693 0.66
georg_m -.0341127 -0.01
georg_s -.5647549 -0.18
louis_e -.4650245 -0.18
louis_w -3.59588 -1.47
miss_n 1.089658 0.36
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District Coefficient t
miss_s 1.120655 0.49
texas_n -.6783285 -0.32
texas_e -.3177394 -0.14
texas_s 1.084171 0.53
texas_w -.514295 -0.25
kent_e 1.590687 0.74
kent_w 2.418506 0.91
mich_e .5073664 0.23
mich_w -.3712496 -0.16
ohio_n .8135191 0.38
ohio_s .7132847 0.30
tenn_e 2.51559 1.12
tenn_m -.1467927 -0.05
tenn_w .9363732 0.40
illin_n 1.501742 0.71
illin_c 1.797984 0.71
illin_s 1.420514 0.59
indi_n .2714836 0.10
indi_s .5980914 0.23
wisc_e 1.338448 0.53
wisc_w .7364379 0.29
ark_e -2.074813 -0.86
ark_w 1.016536 0.33
iowa_n -1.630264 -0.53
iowa_s 3.013034 1.15
minn 1.006604 0.41
misso_e 1.687705 0.75
misso_w 2.41364 1.06
nebraska 2.553374 1.08
ndakota 1.100371 0.34
sdakota .3531468 0.14
arizona .4414999 0.21
cali_n -3.393818 -1.49
cali_e -3.947115 -1.71
cali_c 1.227904 0.60
cali_s 1.892918 0.88
hawaii .6106062 0.26
idaho 1.017648 0.25
montana 1.168049 0.44
nevada 1.519595 0.68
oregon .9752324 0.41
wash_e -.842449 -0.29
wash_w -.4499163 -0.19
colorado .3212224 0.13
kansas 2.985485 1.24
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District Coefficient t
newmex 1.100926 0.49
okla_n -2.472761 -0.85
okla_e .865951 0.31
okla_w 1.083523 0.39
utah 1.177782 0.46
wyoming .3586372 0.11
virg_isl 5.766577 0.99
guam 3.580839 1.08
alaska 2.059119 0.73
louis_m .6016837 0.22
. 
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